Path: utzoo!utgpu!news-server.csri.toronto.edu!cs.utexas.edu!uunet!bu.edu!m2c!wpi.WPI.EDU!penny.wpi.edu!tex From: tex@penny.wpi.edu (Lonnie Paul Mask) Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy Subject: Re: Conciousness Message-ID: <1991May3.015953.12204@wpi.WPI.EDU> Date: 3 May 91 01:59:53 GMT References: <1991Apr16.061532.10775@panix.uucp> <2102@seti.inria.fr> Sender: news@wpi.WPI.EDU (News) Organization: Worcester Polytechnic Institute Lines: 49 Nntp-Posting-Host: penny.wpi.edu In article pja@cis.ohio-state.edu writes: >In article <2102@seti.inria.fr> ziane@nuri.inria.fr (ziane mikal @) writes: > >> In reply to the article cited above, I agree that conciousness >> may be a more interesting problem, since intelligence has >> kind of lost SOME of its mystery. > >Whoops! I disagree completely. While we have identified some interesting >phenomina, intelligence is still a very dark and deep problem. But we can >still talk about your other thoughts regardless. > >> On the other hand, I have another puzzling problem, >> namely pleasure and pain. >> If a computer can simulate pain or pleasure, does it really mean >> that it really suffers or feels pleasure. > >This is the same question as "If a computer simulates a mind then does it have >a mind?" If you believe Strong AI people (Haugeland, Newell and Simon, Fodor, >Pylyshyn), then yes, computer simulation of a physical procees is tantamount to >any interpretation which can be placed on the simulation consistently. Thus a >computer would "feel" pain if a simulation of pain was consistently >interpretable as the physical process of "pain". (See Newell's papers on >Physical Symbol Systems.) > >However, If you believe people such as Searle, Steven Harnad or the Dreyfus >brothers, simulation is not sufficient to posess the characteristic >simulated. For instance, simulating a hurricane by computer doesn't get the >chips wet. Searle's chinese room experiment is one attempt to philosophically >address this question and has direct import to yours. i read in this book on ai and stuff about simulations and the real thing. in supporting the idea that a computer could have a mind if i could simulate one well enough, you have to consider how your model works. the example in the book was digestion. say you make a computer program that models digestion. can you 'feed' the model something like a piece of bread and have it break it down? no. but say you build something with say tubes, and some acid and whatever, and model digestion with this...now, if you give this a piece of real bread, then it will actually break it down...so, in effect, there.s no real difference between the model and real digestion, so there.s no reason to call it digestion. same with the mind, the mind handles information, and if you make a model that handles information such as the then there.s no reason to differentiate it from the human mind. -- ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Arithmetic is being able to count up to twenty without |lonnie mask taking off your shoes. |tex@wpi.wpi.edu -Mickey Mouse |wyle_e on irc ------------------------------------------------------------------------