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From: tom.jennings@f111.n125.z1.FIDONET.ORG (tom jennings)
Newsgroups: comp.org.eff.talk
Subject: Re: behind door #2 is ...
Message-ID: <14060.2818C093@fidogate.FIDONET.ORG>
Date: 26 Apr 91 20:15:47 GMT
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I don't see it as separate from the "credit bureau" issue, as a matter of 
fact I can't even tellt he difference -- it's simply "profiling". My 
assumption is that there's no one "targeting" me specifically (I'm not 
that kinda paranoid :-) but rather a number of odd things lined up in 
someones "profiles" ...

This is why I also think the very concept of profiling is bad. This use 
naturally follows the other. It is why I also think the only su\olution in 
the US is to have the default-built-in safeguards assume the 
data-compilators to have limits up front, rather than "we get to defend 
ourselves" afterwards, like the Equifax people et al propose. Ie. get your 
record(s) and correct errors.
 
All record-compilers could mail us our record once every year or so; we 
edit it, mail it back. This lets them off the hook for liability too as to 
accuracy. Coupled with a royalty or other kickback for usage of the 
record, we'd be in good shape an in cooperative business together. It 
could even hav checkboxes for "things I'm interested in" and the buyers of 
the various databases could provide them with feedback, reporting to the 
data compilers what in the checked boxes I actually bought. The compilers 
could give you a higher royalty based upon the accuracy of boxes checked 
vs. actual transactions etc.
 
Or you could simply return the record marked "do not use my name". Period.


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