Xref: utzoo comp.unix.wizards:25249 alt.security:2362 Path: utzoo!utgpu!news-server.csri.toronto.edu!rpi!zaphod.mps.ohio-state.edu!pacific.mps.ohio-state.edu!linac!att!ucbvax!ulysses!ulysses.att.com!smb From: smb@ulysses.att.com (Steven Bellovin) Newsgroups: comp.unix.wizards,alt.security Subject: Re: BSD tty security, part 4: What You Can Look Forward To Message-ID: <14683@ulysses.att.com> Date: 30 Apr 91 02:32:44 GMT References: <3600:Apr2614:04:4391@kramden.acf.nyu.edu> <13218@goofy.Apple.COM> <1991Apr29.222139.21284@pcserver2.naitc.com> Sender: netnews@ulysses.att.com Lines: 55 In article <1991Apr29.222139.21284@pcserver2.naitc.com>, kdenning@pcserver2.naitc.com (Karl Denninger) writes: [mostly deleted] Dan is caught between a rock and a hard place here. He knows of certain security problems in many existing systems. What should he do with the information? One answer is to post and be damned. Lots of people advocate that. I sometimes do, myself -- as noted, the crackers often know the problems, too. In this case, the bug is very widespread. Another answer is to tell vendors and CERT. This is a favorite of folks who don't like the first answer. He's tried that; according to his earlier postings, some vendors, at least, aren't interested. Robert Morris had his answer to the problem of how you get vendors to fix security problems, but it bought him a felony conviction. Most people consider that too high a price to pay. Face it, there's no satisfying everyone. What Dan has done -- offered details to anyone who can prove his or her legitimacy -- is certainly defensible as an answer. Your and I may not (or may) agree with it, but it's as reasonable a choice as either of the first two. > From the manual pages [on TIOCSTI], I believe it shouldn't work. I believe you're barking up the wrong termite-infested tree. Although I haven't seen a detailed report on the problem, there were sufficient clues in the first three parts that I'm fairly certain I know what rock these bugs are hiding under. To be sure, I'm already predisposed to think in those terms -- Dan did cite my paper as relevant. (For those who are interested, the citation is ``The "Session Tty" Manager'' Bellovin, S.M., Proceedings of USENIX Conference, San Francisco, CA, Jun 30, 1988, P339-354.) > If this is not true, I would like details. Not just "fixes", or > pontificating, but details. I can patch around lots of things, and > replace system code if necessary. Without some DETAILS it's > difficult at best. To annouce the details now would be to opt for choice 1. Dan has already rejected that approach. For those who don't believe the bugs exist, he has offered Keith Bostic as a reference. You can't do better than Keith, but if the network wants, I'll offer myself as another reference -- Dan and I have corresponded enough that I'm sure he'll trust me with the info... Not that I really need to see it -- as I said, I think I know where the bodies are buried. (Gee -- that's my third metaphor for the same problem, and all in one posting...) Incidentally, offering (threatening?) to post programs that exploit the bugs is in itself a pretty good warrantee. Dan wouldn't risk his reputation if he didn't have those programs written already, I suspect. --Steve Bellovin