Xref: utzoo comp.unix.wizards:25271 alt.security:2378 Path: utzoo!utgpu!news-server.csri.toronto.edu!rpi!usc!snorkelwacker.mit.edu!stanford.edu!unix!hsdndev!cmcl2!kramden.acf.nyu.edu!brnstnd From: brnstnd@kramden.acf.nyu.edu (Dan Bernstein) Newsgroups: comp.unix.wizards,alt.security Subject: Re: BSD tty security, part 4: What You Can Look Forward To Message-ID: <26844:May100:59:2591@kramden.acf.nyu.edu> Date: 1 May 91 00:59:25 GMT References: <1991Apr29.222139.21284@pcserver2.naitc.com> <14683@ulysses.att.com> <1991Apr30.164646.11693@pcserver2.naitc.com> Organization: IR Lines: 36 In article <1991Apr30.164646.11693@pcserver2.naitc.com> kdenning@pcserver2.naitc.com (Karl Denninger) writes: > In article <14683@ulysses.att.com> smb@ulysses.att.com (Steven Bellovin) writes: > >Face it, there's no satisfying everyone. What Dan has done -- offered > >details to anyone who can prove his or her legitimacy -- is certainly > >defensible as an answer. Your and I may not (or may) agree with it, > >but it's as reasonable a choice as either of the first two. > Well, I've sent him mail, and he sent back some "hints". That is not > details. And I'm as real, and as legitimate, as anyone on the net. I'm > responsible for the wide-area network security here at this facility. Let me be more explicit. I consider vendors to have a legitimate interest by default. I probably should have said just vendors, but there are organizations like CERT that I consider to have a legitimate interest but that aren't vendors. There are also individuals who can and have convinced me that they should see the code, for various reasons. I do not consider someone to have a legitimate interest in security-breaking code merely by virtue of being a system administrator. If I did, then I should be sending the code to practically everyone--- there's no fine line between the manager of a major site and the ``manager'' of a personal workstation. And that is an unacceptable risk. > 2) The good guys, on the other hand, have to hunt around looking for > the problems and devise proof for the "bean counters" before we can > get any time allocated to work on a REAL fix. Sorry if you don't consider the detailed fixes I've posted to be a REAL fix. I'd love to hear from anyone who can propose a simpler set of fixes that can still be proven to work. As for explaining this to your boss: I'm sorry I can't be any help here. I note that it is a lot more cost effective for FooBar Computer Co. to make fixes once and distribute them to 1000 admins than to have 1000 admins each make fixes for themselves. ---Dan