Xref: utzoo comp.unix.wizards:25308 alt.security:2391
Path: utzoo!utgpu!news-server.csri.toronto.edu!cs.utexas.edu!helios!bloom-beacon!eru!hagbard!sunic!news.funet.fi!funic!santra!news
From: jkp@cs.HUT.FI (Jyrki Kuoppala)
Newsgroups: comp.unix.wizards,alt.security
Subject: Re: BSD tty security, part 4: What You Can Look Forward To
Message-ID: <1991May1.142159.15087@santra.uucp>
Date: 1 May 91 14:21:59 GMT
References: <13218@goofy.Apple.COM> <1991Apr29.222139.21284@pcserver2.naitc.com> <14683@ulysses.att.com> <1991Apr30.164646.11693@pcserver2.naitc.com>
Sender: news@santra.uucp (Cnews - USENET news system)
Reply-To: jkp@cs.HUT.FI (Jyrki Kuoppala)
Followup-To: comp.unix.wizards
Organization: Helsinki University of Technology, Finland
Lines: 18
In-Reply-To: kdenning@pcserver2.naitc.com (Karl Denninger)

In article <1991Apr30.164646.11693@pcserver2.naitc.com>, kdenning@pcserver2 (Karl Denninger) writes:
>I've got a few ideas too, but most of them rely on the pty being
>world-writable.  I normally run with "mesg n"; if these bugs get through
>>that< then I really do want to hear about it, and exactly what he's talking
>about.

The program doing the stuffing can just open the pty before you say
'mesg n' on it.  Looking at what Dan has posted, I wouldn't be
surprised if there were other ways also, but I don't have more
information on that

>Now if the manual pages are wrong (ie: they're lying) with regards to the
>restrictions on some of those ioctl calls......

I don't think they are lying, just that at least some of the
restrictions can be gotten around.

//Jyrki