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From: ari@Mordor.Stanford.EDU (Ari Ollikainen)
Newsgroups: comp.society.futures
Subject: Re: Techno Terror
Summary: Failure modes
Message-ID: <1991May7.003221.8585@morrow.stanford.edu>
Date: 7 May 91 00:32:21 GMT
References: <9517@suned1.Nswses.Navy.MIL>
Sender: news@morrow.stanford.edu (News Service)
Reply-To: ari@Mordor.Stanford.EDU (Ari Ollikainen)
Organization: Stanford University
Lines: 22

I'm somewhat surprised that no one has commented on the potentially 
disasterous failure mode associated with proposed designs of automated 
highways: NO provision for vehicles stopping due to mechanical failure or
running out of fuel!

If the system doesn't power the vehicles it controls AND the power CAN
be interrupted then the vehicle MAY become an uncontrolled obstacle in 
a fast moving stream of otherwise controlled vehicles. Imagine the 
repercussions of the system deciding to decelerate ALL traffic to avoid
damage to the uncontrolled obstacle...Would the automated system just hand 
control of vehicles in the vicinity of the stalled vehicle back to the 
drivers and expect them to deal with the "perturbation" in flow?

Before thinking about the possible effects of techno terrorism, I suggest 
we consider the elements necessary in the design and implementation of
automated systems to make them operate safely in obvious failure situations...

Ari Ollikainen
Networking Technology Analyst
ESnet/NERSC
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
Ari@Pohjola.NERSC.GOV