Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy Path: utzoo!utgpu!news-server.csri.toronto.edu!rpi!zaphod.mps.ohio-state.edu!think.com!mintaka!bloom-picayune.mit.edu!news From: mlevin@jade.tufts.edu Subject: Turing Test: opinions on an idea Message-ID: <1991May13.133711.102@athena.mit.edu> Followup-To: mlevin@jade.tufts.edu Sender: news@athena.mit.edu (News system) Organization: Me, Myself, and I, inc. Distribution: usa Date: Mon, 13 May 91 13:37:11 GMT Lines: 30 I am new to this group, so if this has been covered recently, please point me to the articles. I'd like to hear opinions on the following thought I had, about the Turing Test. Start off with a story. Suppose in X years, physics gets to such a point where very fast storage and retrieval of arbitrary amounts of information is easy (imagine some sort of hyperdimensional memory, or something). They then make an enormous 'game-tree' of all possible conversations in English (taking into account randomizing elements, repeat questions, etc.), and make an idiot box that simply accepts inputs from an interrogator, and, by direct table look-up, spits out answers, which are good enough to pass the Turing Test. I imagine supporters of the test (except behaviorists, I guess) will not want to classify this device as intelligent (or as a 'person') in any sense of the word. One way out for them is to say that this device exploits advances in a science (physics/engineering) which really has nothing to do with the question of sentience, to produce an indistinguishable simulation of the real thing. Given that, what is to stop an opponent of AI (like a dualist, for example) from saying the same thing about any currently-feasable AI project? i.e., that it exploits advances in computer science to produce a good simulation, but really has nothing to do with the question of primary consciousness? Any and all opinions are welcome. Especially, if anyone has seen this problem brought up in the literature before (I vaguely recall someone telling me this has already been thought of), I'd appreciate a reference. Mike Levin