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From: maxwebb@moe.cse.ogi.edu (Max G. Webb)
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
Subject: Re: Turing Test: opinions on an idea
Summary: this is a shell game.
Message-ID: <21341@ogicse.ogi.edu>
Date: 13 May 91 17:52:17 GMT
Article-I.D.: ogicse.21341
References: <1991May13.133711.102@athena.mit.edu>
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Organization: Oregon Graduate Institute - Computer Science & Engineering
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In article <1991May13.133711.102@athena.mit.edu> mlevin@jade.tufts.edu writes:

>... They then make an enormous
>'game-tree' of all possible conversations in English (taking 
>into account randomizing elements, repeat questions,
>etc.), and make an idiot box that simply accepts inputs from an
>interrogator, and, by direct table look-up, spits out answers, which
>are good enough to pass the Turing Test.

How do they generate this 'enormous game tree' of all possible
conversations? If automatically, then the part that does it
automatically is arguably the part that has passed the test,
demonstrated it's understanding of natural language (and of
the exterior world knowledge that that entails). If by hand (HAH!)
Then the part that does it is _known_ to be intelligent.

In other words, this argument plays a shell game. The hard part
(generating all possible conversations) is what would be tested
by this procedure, and is not addressed.

You might as well say that playing a good chess game doesn't
prove your opponent understands chess. How do you know he
doesn't have a huge game tree somewhere? The answer is, whatever
compiled that game tree is your true opponent, and understands
chess.

>  Given that, what is to stop an opponent of AI (like a
>dualist, for example) from saying the same thing about any
>currently-feasable AI project? i.e., that it exploits advances in
>computer science to produce a good simulation, but really has nothing
>to do with the question of primary consciousness? 

The following should slow him down a bit:

	1) The above argument is a shell game.
	2) Behavior, and your biological similarity to other humans
	   are the only clues you have of their consciousness.
	   Since some current approaches to AI involve biologically
	   inspired designs, if and when they exhibit the same
	   behavioral clues, you have _all_ the same reasons to
	   suspect the one of being conscious as the other.

All the dualist would have to fall back on is interspecies chauvinism.
(Which is what he started out with. Why else this need to
show our superiority over all possible machines?)

Even *DUALLISTS* have to use behavioral criteria.

>Mike Levin

	Max