Path: utzoo!utgpu!news-server.csri.toronto.edu!rpi!usc!wuarchive!rex!samsung!zaphod.mps.ohio-state.edu!think.com!snorkelwacker.mit.edu!bloom-beacon!eru!hagbard!sunic!dkuug!daimi!protonen From: protonen@daimi.aau.dk (Lars J|dal) Newsgroups: comp.os.minix Subject: Re: gak! yet another idiot beginner asking stupid stuff! Message-ID: <1991May16.093136.11171@daimi.aau.dk> Date: 16 May 91 09:31:36 GMT References: <9852@star.cs.vu.nl> <9105102589@arrakis.nl.mugnet.org> <1991May13.124327.21919@nmrdc1.nmrdc.nnmc.navy.mil> <1991May14.202411.3372@nuchat.sccsi.com> Sender: protonen@daimi.aau.dk (Lars J|dal) Organization: DAIMI: Computer Science Department, Aarhus University, Denmark Lines: 24 kevin@nuchat.sccsi.com (Kevin Brown) writes: [...] >The reason for all that is that the chown() system call requires root privs >under Minix. Under System V, it doesn't, but instead checks to see whether >or not the owner of the file (or root) is trying to change the file's >ownership. On systems without disk quota, the approach taken by System V >is the Right Answer (IMHO). But the System V approach leads to problems on >systems that implement disk quota (you want more space? chown your files to >root! :-)... [...] Doesn't this approach give a security problem (whether or not you have quotas)? As I see it, you could just make your brilliant hackerprogram suid and then change the owner to root! If the approach has been used in a real UNIX system, of course an obvious problem like this would have been foreseen at implementation :-), so I must be misunderstanding something. What? +--------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | Lars J|dal | (put your favourite quotation here) | | protonen@daimi.aau.dk | | |--------------------------------------------------------------------------| | Computer Science Department - Aarhus University - Aarhus - Denmark | +--------------------------------------------------------------------------+