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From: swarren@convex.com (Steve Warren)
Newsgroups: comp.sys.amiga.advocacy
Subject: Re: New Thread: What _REALLY_ makes a product successful?
Message-ID: <1991May20.173553.11809@convex.com>
Date: 20 May 91 17:35:53 GMT
References: <72306@microsoft.UUCP> <760@mixcom.COM>
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In article <760@mixcom.COM> hhxxee@mixcom.COM (C. Richard Miller) writes:
>tom@microsoft.UUCP (Tom MCCONNELL) writes:
>
>I'll put in a vote for effective marketing as that "unknown"
>factor, Tom.
>

 Marketing was a factor, but not the "unknown" factor.  The unknown factor was
a synergistic combination of marketing and standards, and IBM stumbled into it
by dumb luck, screaming and thrashing all the way.

IBM marketed their PCs well enough that they were quickly established as the
small computer system of choice for businesses.  Not that this was exactly a
gargantuum task, since no one had ever made an attempt to *really* market a
business system before (others had made feeble efforts before, but no one
really went all out to *be* the business system of choice before IBM).

Here is how IBM "stumbled" onto standards:  because they had larger systems
that had extremely low performance/price ratios when compared to a
state-of-the-art micro, IBM decided that they could not afford to sell a micro
that encroached on their other, more costly systems.  So they designed their
micro systems to be slow and memory limited.  They picked a microprocessor
that they felt would not threaten their other product lines, and they put
together a system that was altogether underwhelming.  Then they marketed it as
if it were an innovation, and it worked.

What happened next is that the free market kicked in.  Once a few sharp
engineers noticed how incredibly low-tech this box was, and how incredibly
high IBM's margin was, they decided to knock-off some copies.  When everyone
in the world began making and selling these boxes the competition forced
prices down to the point that PC-compatibles became commodities.  That was
when everyday people began to purchase them.

The magic happens when intensive marketing is combined with standards.  In
IBM's case the "standard" was de facto rather than formal.  But nevertheless
the standard was real.

The Apple Macintosh had intensive marketing, but they maintained the
proprietary qualities of their system.  As a result it was successful, but not
an overwhelming success like the PC from IBM.  Going back in time, the S-100
bus systems had the standards, but there was no marketing.  It takes both to
get the kind of success that the IBM-PC enjoys today.

The Amiga is a wonder.  It has been saddled with the double albotrosses of a
proprietary architecture and OS, and a lack-luster marketing attempt.  The
fact that it is still alive and kicking is a testament to the inherent
superiority of these proprietary components over the other systems that
existed at the time it was introduced.  If the Amiga had been licensed and
marketed it would have won.  It *has* won in some niche markets.  But it could
have been a contender.

The CDTV has these things going for it:

1)  First to market (major importance).

2)  Limited licensing (giving lip service to standards).

3)  Good margin (my guess. - This is what made the PC attractive for cloners).

It has these things going against it:

1)  Large consortium committed to opposing standard.

2)  Very little marketing (compared to what will be fielded by CDI).

No one will want to clone the CDTV if it is not marketed more effectively.
Once CDI is publicly launched Commodore will be unable to match the combined
war chest of the CDI adherents.  So now is the time to grab market-share like
there is no tomorrow.  As far as opportunities for marketing CDTV, there may
*be* no tomorrow.
--
            _.
--Steve   ._||__
  Warren   v\ *|
             V