Path: utzoo!utgpu!news-server.csri.toronto.edu!rpi!usc!zaphod.mps.ohio-state.edu!wuarchive!uunet!mcsun!ukc!inmos!conor@lion.inmos.co.uk From: conor@lion.inmos.co.uk (Conor O'Neill) Newsgroups: comp.sys.transputer Subject: Re: Anarchic protocol ANY (occam2) Message-ID: <16171@ganymede.inmos.co.uk> Date: 21 May 91 13:00:30 GMT References: <9105152020.AA15174@theory.TN.CORNELL.EDU> <1758@culhua.prg.ox.ac.uk> <1991May20.113104.25938@rodan.acs.syr.edu> Sender: news@inmos.co.uk Reply-To: conor@inmos.co.uk (Conor O'Neill) Organization: INMOS Limited, Bristol, UK. Lines: 19 In article <1991May20.113104.25938@rodan.acs.syr.edu> greeny@top.cis.syr.edu (Jonathan Greenfield) writes: >A secure language implementation detects any violation of the language >definition, either at compile-time, or at run-time. If a language cannot be >implemented in a secure manner, then the language design is flawed. If a >language can be implemented in a secure manner, but a particular system fails >to do so, then the system design is flawed. > >Jonathan The name `Anarchic protocol' indicates that it circumvents any compiler checking. Once CHAN OF ANY is used, it is no longer a secure language implementation. Maybe we should remove CHAN OF ANY (:-) --- Conor O'Neill, Software Group, INMOS Ltd., UK. UK: conor@inmos.co.uk US: conor@inmos.com "It's state-of-the-art" "But it doesn't work!" "That is the state-of-the-art".