Xref: utzoo comp.unix.wizards:25712 alt.security:2601 Path: utzoo!utgpu!news-server.csri.toronto.edu!rpi!think.com!hsdndev!cmcl2!kramden.acf.nyu.edu!brnstnd From: brnstnd@kramden.acf.nyu.edu (Dan Bernstein) Newsgroups: comp.unix.wizards,alt.security Subject: Re: BSD tty security, part 4: What You Can Look Forward To Message-ID: <19659:May2122:17:2991@kramden.acf.nyu.edu> Date: 21 May 91 22:17:29 GMT References: <19280@rpp386.cactus.org> <29167:May1918:13:2991@kramden.acf.nyu.edu> <19315@rpp386.cactus.org> Organization: IR Lines: 34 In article <19315@rpp386.cactus.org> jfh@rpp386.cactus.org (John F Haugh II) writes: > >Face it, John: revoke() does not solve any problems that avoiding a used > >tty entirely doesn't solve. The most revoke() can do is guarantee that > >the tty used for login is clean, and that's exactly what my proposals > >do. Stop pretending that there's some advantage to revoke(). > Sure there are. "Denial of service". If I manage to take up all > the pty's, how are you ever going to get me off the port? If a user opens all the ptys (which he can't under my proposal since they're protected), nobody will be able to open any of them again, and revoke() doesn't do diddly about that. If a user has access to all the ttys, then under my proposal not only will all those ttys will be accounted to him, but he'll have to be running under a telnetd or rlogind or whatever on each port, so all the ptys will be open anyway. Once again revoke() does absolutely nothing. > I don't care what happens when you login. I want to know what happens > =after= you login. Get it through you think skull. I don't care about > login time. F*ck login time. It's too bad you feel that way. Right now I'm focusing on tty security, and each login process runs under a tty. (This isn't how it should be: you should allocate as few resources as possible to someone who hasn't idenitifed himself. Wasting an entire tty is silly.) If the line is clean before login runs, it will remain clean unless the user does something stupid, like find / -user `whoami` -exec chmod {} 666 \;. > How does the Dan Bernstein Trusted Path Manager get that process off > the line, other than arguing with it for 2 weeks before doing nothing? It ignores it---and enforces security---by using another line. Which is what Dan Bernstein should probably be doing to you. ---Dan