Path: utzoo!utgpu!news-server.csri.toronto.edu!bonnie.concordia.ca!thunder.mcrcim.mcgill.edu!snorkelwacker.mit.edu!apple!veritas!amdcad!amdcad!military From: sysmgr@KING.ENG.UMD.EDU (Doug Mohney) Newsgroups: sci.military Subject: Re: F-22 vs F-23 3rd Part Message-ID: <1991May18.050854.10664@amd.com> Date: 17 May 91 14:05:13 GMT References: <1991May17.063018.1001@amd.com> Sender: military@amd.com Organization: The U. of MD, CP, CAD lab Lines: 74 Approved: military@amd.com From: sysmgr@KING.ENG.UMD.EDU (Doug Mohney) carlo@gaia.gcs.oz.au (Carlo Kopp) writes: On YF-22 vs YF-23 selection: >The decision criteria for selection were pretty broad and covered performance >and ability to meet the design spec, ability to meet manufacturer's internal >spec, price, life-cycle-cost and development risk. Both manufacturers management teams were examined. The Lockheed-lead team was better organized and had a solid approach to most aspects of the project. Northrop's cost-overruns and managerial problems with the B-2 program did not help. >MDC and Northrop have ongoing commitments for the C-17, F/A-18 and B-2 >respectively, The B-2 is not a sure thing. The F/A-18 is a maybe; Grumman will fight for production of versions of the F-14 over beating on the F/A-18E/F for an A-12 interm replacement. >The USAF however had NO choice in this matter as the Administration killed >the A-12 Avenger in January due cost overruns resulting from high risk R&D. >By killing off the radical but high performance A-12, the Administration set >a clear precedent. The A-12 was a poorly managed program, and General Dynamics had little previous experience with large composite structures. Two high-ranking Navy officers were not cashed in for the failure of high risk R&D. >As a result, the USAF had no choice than to pursue the lowest risk design >options regardless of any other criteria. >If the USAF chose the F-23 and it got >into difficulties say in 1994 due R&D problems, it would almost certainly die >the death of the A-12. Politicians generally seem to have little respect for >air warfare strategy. The full price tag on the ATF program puts it into jeopardy over the long run, regardless. There might be no more than one or two "silver bullet" squadrons built. You can't built $100 million/copy planes by the hundreds without something else being sacrificed. USAF also has to provide for the MultiRole Fighter, a replacement for the F-16, over the next 5 years. Development for it won't be cheap. >As for the future of the F-23, it may not end up being adopted by the Navy >simply because the Navy is having real money problems, ie buying F-18s >instead of its preferred F-14s. Wahhhhh? The F-23 will never, ever be put on a carrier; its low-speed characteristics stick compared to the F-22, and you'd need serious money to strengthen the landing gear and get the wings to fold on it... > Therefore the Navy is unlikely to buy any >Naval ATFs until the end of the decade, by which time the Lockheed product >will have matured whereas the Northrop one will have sat on the shelf. >Alternative roles for the airframe could be theatre strike and reconnaisance, That's goofy. The A-12 was going to be the ATA for the Air Force. You'll note the lack of external hardpoints and internal carriage on the F-23. >Final Observation: politics is always a stronger decision criterion than >technology or air warfare strategy No, affordability and price are. Had this project been run in the '70s, it is quite likely the YF-23 would have been selected. Today, because we do not have deep pockets, the bottom line must be watched. -- SYSMGR@CADLAB.ENG.UMD.EDU