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From: bwoodman@magnus.acs.ohio-state.edu (Robert H Woodman)
Newsgroups: sci.military
Subject: Re: Gulf Lessons re length of preliminary bombardment
Message-ID: <1991May21.024354.13558@amd.com>
Date: 20 May 91 13:32:39 GMT
References: <1991May20.052128.21457@amd.com>
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From: bwoodman@magnus.acs.ohio-state.edu (Robert H Woodman)


tedrick@triangle.Berkeley.EDU (Tom Tedrick) writes:
>But it may be that the optimal length of time, in certain cases, is a
>month or more. This is because, such lengthy bombardments can cause
>near universal psychological casualties, amongst the target population,
>and after a long enough time of waiting for a ground attack to come,
>inertia may set in amongst the defenders. Thus the element of surprise,
>for the ground attack, may be regained to a certain extent.
>
>Thus, it may be the case, that air supremacy can guarantee victory on
>the ground, in future battles.

     While I could agree with that reasoning to a point, I would add that there
were some apparently unique factors in the Gulf war that may not apply to all
future wars.

     First, the KTO was a confined area.  This allowed massive bombardment on a
concentrated area, increasing both physical and psychological damage to the
enemy troops.  If we were at war with our old nemesis, the Soviet Union and 
Warsaw Pact, the operational theater would be much larger, thus the physical
damage could be equal to that seen in the KTO, and yet the cumulative psycho-
logical effect would be less because of the distribution of the damage.

     Second, the Iraqi Air Force was clearly inferior.  Superiority was gained
in a couple of days, with air supremecy following just a few days after that.
There is no guarantee that such conditions will exist in other wars and other
theaters of operation.

     Third, the Iraqi troops were not expecting the kind of massive bombardment
rained down on them.  In future conflicts, defending troops might expect such a
tactic and try to prepare accordingly.  Thus, shelters might be made stronger.
Antiaircraft defenses might be more concentrated and better placed for defense.
Other tactics might be employed to offset the devestation of massive bombard-
ment.  

     In short, the astounding way in which air supremacy affected the outcome
of the Persian Gulf war may be unique to the theater in which it was fought.
It does not necessarily follow that such conditions will be equally relevant 
in the future.

     Comments?  Discussion?  Intelligent argument?

-- 
Robert H. "Bob" Woodman, PhD
INTERNET:  woodman.1@osu.edu