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From: dthompso@magnus.acs.ohio-state.edu (David G Thompson)
Newsgroups: sci.military
Subject: MAC briefing
Message-ID: <1991May22.035007.28021@amd.com>
Date: 21 May 91 23:15:39 GMT
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Organization: The Ohio State University
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From: dthompso@magnus.acs.ohio-state.edu (David G Thompson)


This afternoon I attended a presentation by Brig. Gen. James L.
Cole, Jr., Military Air Command Assistant Director for
Operations, on U.S. airlift op's in Desert Shield/Storm.  A few
of his prominent points were the following:

Although this was the first time it was ever actually mobilized
since its inception in 1951, the CRAF (Civilian Reserve Air
Fleet) system was a remarkable success.  All 24 commercial
carriers involved in the program contributed much-needed
aircraft, primarily for moving personnel rather than cargo.  The
hasty conversion of a few 747s to cargo duty was mainly
ineffective, due mainly to loading problems (no ramp, etc.) 
Employment of civilian crews in the AOR (Area of Responsibility;
aka, Saudi Arabia) created other headaches (e.g., security
clearance for necessary ops briefings, chemical protections while
on the ground, etc.), but for the most part worked well.

The temporary lull following the initial crash-deployment in
August-September proved invaluable to MAC in catching up on
aircrew fatigue and maintenance tasks.  Gen. Cole pointed out
that the problems of chronic fatigue in sustained operations are
nearly impossible to forecast in training.  In the first 30 days,
MAC lifted 91,000 personnel and 72,000 tons of cargo to the AOR. 
For comparison, peak 30-day lifts to Vietnam and Israel in 1973
were approx. 21,000 tons.

MAC controlled flow of world-wide airlift sorties through a
predesignated CAT (Crisis Action Team) of approximately 50
personnel, centered on 6 colonels backed up by Cole and the Dir.
of Ops in dealing with other general officers.  Bottlenecks
appear to have been few, minimized by recently developed software
which was perfected in a "blast-furnace crucible" of the most
intense airlift to date.  The software contractor was kept on the
spot with the CAT throughout, guaranteeing full customer service!

Prioritization of loads was a crucial question, especially during
the initial (Aug-Sept) phase.  Ultimate authority was CENTCOM's;
however, other agencies making sudden emergency demands for
immediate MAC service often had to be reminded to go through the
proper chain of command.  Cole gave the Marine Corps top marks
for excellent preparation, staff work, and load discipline.

The approximate total ratio of sealifted material to that
airlifted was 90% / 10%; Cole commented that this was close to
the same case during Vietnam.  In limited cases heavy equipment
was airlifted if a special need existed; for example, some AFVs
during initial phase, and in another example, Army tank
transporters by direct order of Schwarzkopf due to urgent
requirement.  Air/sea/land transport was coordinated by the
inter-service TRANSCOM agency, established in 1986.  Cole said
this functioned fairly well, despite most "customers" preference
for air transport; the common feeling was that loads sent by sea
were more likely to get lost in the pipeline, even if they
weren't necessarily time-critical.

Total performance by MAC as of 11 Mar 91: 504,518 personnel,
542,011 tons delivered to AOR.  

Cole warned of the impending retirement of C-141; phase-out must
begin in approximately 2 years due to structural fatigue.  Most
aircraft have only about 10,000 hours life remaining, despite
SLEP (Service Life Extension Program) benefits.  Cole endorsed
the C-17 as an effective replacement, and expressed concern over
cut-backs to only 120 units on order.  He suggested that allied
nations should consider acquisition of C-17 as well, citing
example of French deployments to Africa which in past have
depended on U.S. support; this would drive down unit cost of C-17
for USAF as well, and extend availability of production options. 
(Maybe if we had French congressmen we could write to?)

Overall, MAC seems to have performed extremely well.  Cole's
primary concern seems to be that in the wake of such success,
Congress will assume that miracles can be performed with nothing. 
In fact these crews were pushed to the very edge of their
capabilities, and it is remarkable that only 1 crash occurred. 
Given projected force structure, Cole said it is unlikely that we
could do the same thing again in 3 years, especially with the
anticipated resignation of approximately 20% (some unit estimates
as high as 50%) of reserve air components following end of call-
up.  The Total Force sounds nice, but a call-up extended from 90
to 180 days, and then to 2 years, hits some people very hard.

Cole will assume his new post responsible for USAF safety in the
near future.  He is a veteran of extensive AC-47 gunship
operations in SE Asia.

--David G. Thompson
dthompso@magnus.acs.ohio-state.edu