Path: utzoo!utgpu!news-server.csri.toronto.edu!rpi!usc!cs.utexas.edu!sun-barr!newstop!sun!amdcad!amdcad!military From: carlo@gaia.gcs.oz.au (Carlo Kopp) Newsgroups: sci.military Subject: Re: F-22 vs F-23 3rd Part Message-ID: <1991May22.035236.28510@amd.com> Date: 22 May 91 01:56:30 GMT Sender: military@amd.com Organization: Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. Lines: 145 Approved: military@amd.com From: Carlo Kopp sysmgr@KING.ENG.UMD.EDU (Doug Mohney) writes: >Both manufacturers management teams were examined. The Lockheed-lead team was >better organized and had a solid approach to most aspects of the project. >Northrop's cost-overruns and managerial problems with the B-2 program did not >help. That is very much the Administration's party line on the matter. I think you may want to look at a broader range of sources before you make that kind of unqualified assertion. >The B-2 is not a sure thing. The F/A-18 is a maybe; Grumman will fight for >production of versions of the F-14 over beating on the F/A-18E/F for an A-12 >interm replacement. Again you ought to review your facts. There are outstanding commitments to F/A-18C purchases regardless of the E/F model. The Navy appears to have accepted the loss of new F-14D production in favour of F/A-18E/Fs simply for reasons of cost (total life cycle cost in this instance - notwithstanding Grumman's recent proposals for reduced purchase price), ie it cannot afford more F-14Ds, AX development, F/A-18E/Fs, further F/A-18C/Ds and initial NATF funding. Insofar as the B-2 goes, in terms of its development program it is actually a rather mature design due the major airframe design revisions carried out during the mid eighties in order to strengthen the airframe for low altitude penetration. The only problem the B-2 has at this time are grandstanding politicians to whom stealth is dangerous black magic and who stand to gain political points by killing the project. >The A-12 was a poorly managed program, and General Dynamics had little previous >experience with large composite structures. Two high-ranking Navy officers were >not cashed in for the failure of high risk R&D. The A-12 program had similar problems to the sixties TFX program - weight and integration. In all fairness these are generic to any large airframe project where you are pushing the technology of the day to the limit. Add to that the compartmentalising of the management structure to accommodate the secrecy requirements of a 'black' program and you are guaranteed to have problems. Anyone with any project management experience will have many instances to tell of - the less experience exists with a given technology, the less predictable your project timing and costs. Having been there myself, I know. Again, I suggest you look at some alternate sources and perhaps get the contractors' story - I'm not convinced that the party line is the whole story as you seem to imply. >The full price tag on the ATF program puts it into jeopardy over the long run, >regardless. There might be no more than one or two "silver bullet" squadrons >built. You can't built $100 million/copy planes by the hundreds without >something else being sacrificed. >USAF also has to provide for the MultiRole Fighter, a replacement for the F-16, >over the next 5 years. Development for it won't be cheap. Please tell the group where you acquired the two squadron number from ? I am certainly very interested. >Wahhhhh? The F-23 will never, ever be put on a carrier; its low-speed >characteristics stick compared to the F-22, and you'd need serious money to >strengthen the landing gear and get the wings to fold on it... An interesting assertion - I hope you can support it. Lockheed certainly thought the F-22's approach configuration speed/handling sufficiently unsuited to CV ops to propose a Variable Geometry (ie swing wing) NATF derivative airframe to meet the Navy's weight/speed recovery requirements. The Northrop airframe has substantially greater lifting area and reportedly much lower approach speeds than it competitor - also some of Northrop's key flight test/development personnel have Navy backgrounds which will have necessarily reflected in preferred handling characteristics. Where the Lockheed aircraft has been reported as better handling than the Northrop design is in the high AoA low speed (ie 200-350 kt IAS) range where its hybrid planform and big tails work to an advantage. At low AoA and IAS < 180 kt ie dirty approach configuration the hybrid planform does not offer dramatically superior lift/drag performance to other wings with similar low aspect ratio and sweepback. >> Therefore the Navy is unlikely to buy any >>Naval ATFs until the end of the decade, by which time the Lockheed product >>will have matured whereas the Northrop one will have sat on the shelf. > >>Alternative roles for the airframe could be theatre strike and reconnaisance, > >That's goofy. The A-12 was going to be the ATA for the Air Force. You'll note >the lack of external hardpoints and internal carriage on the F-23. On the contrary. The USAF was never very keen on the ATA (and probably shed no tears over its demise) as it didn't fit the USAF's paradigm of a tactical fighter. In practical terms, all the ATA offered what the F-117A didn't have was better payload radius and all weather radar nav/attack. The USAF's principal deep strike interdictors, the F-111 and F-15E are both aircraft with the speed and payload radius of a long range air superiority airframe. Your assertion that the lack of external hardpoints and internal munition carriage would prevent the YF-23 from being developed for deep interdiction is irrational. Firstly the nominal weapon load of any deep strike interdictor today is set at two 2,000 lb class GBU-10 or GBU-24/27 semi-active laser homing munitions. These typically require 15 ft + of weapon bay length which isn't much more than an AIM-120 Amraam occupies. I suspect (can anybody confirm this ?) that the existing central weapon bay of the YF-23 is close to these dimensions, certainly big enough to accommodate the smaller 1,000 lb Paveway munitions. Secondly, the payload/radius performance of the ATF is easily in the class of the F-111 and would not be hurt at all by internal munition carriage. Were the mission profile not to require the use of afterburner, the design of the (hypothetical) YA/F-23 could be lighter and cheaper due to the resulting simplification of the exhaust trough and tailpipe design. The airframe would still retain supersonic capability, less the 1.4:1 thrust/weight ratio needed for dogfights. Theatre reconnaisance is another role which requires speed and range and if possible, stealthiness. Fitting the central weapon bay with a sensor and fuel pallet would provide an upgrade path without major airframe changes. >>Final Observation: politics is always a stronger decision criterion than >>technology or air warfare strategy > >No, affordability and price are. Had this project been run in the '70s, it is >quite likely the YF-23 would have been selected. Today, because we do not have >deep pockets, the bottom line must be watched. Nice, but you're promoting the party line again. I suggest you take a serious look at the real decisionmaking criteria which apply on large defence projects. It is a bit more complex than what you might read about in AvLeak. You might want to talk to some project managers employed by defence contractors. Carlo Kopp carlo@gaia.gcs.oz.au