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From: swilliam@oasys.dt.navy.mil (Steve Williams)
Newsgroups: sci.military
Subject: Re: Gulf Lessons re length of preliminary bombardment
Message-ID: <1991May23.063031.17726@amd.com>
Date: 21 May 91 12:04:40 GMT
Article-I.D.: amd.1991May23.063031.17726
References: <1991May20.052128.21457@amd.com> <1991May21.024354.13558@amd.com>
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From: swilliam@oasys.dt.navy.mil (Steve Williams)


>From: bwoodman@magnus.acs.ohio-state.edu (Robert H Woodman)
>If we were at war with our old nemesis, the Soviet Union and Warsaw 
>Pact, the operational theater would be much larger, thus the physical 
>damage could be equal to that seen in the KTO, and yet the cumulative 
>psychological effect would be less because of the distribution of the 
>damage.

This may be comparing apples and oranges.  For example, we might be 
using nuclear weapons on Russia and Warsaw Pact countries instead of 
the conventional bombs that we used on Iraq. Likewise, Russia will use 
nuclear weapons against us. Furthermore, Russia has a greater ability 
to hit our American soil with their long range bombers, submarine-launched
missiles, and intercontinental missiles that Iraq didn't have.  Thus, 
it would be a war with much greater destruction on both sides.

>Third, the Iraqi troops were not expecting the kind of massive bombardment
>rained down on them.  

That was Iraq's bad underestimation of our capabilities.  A serious
military mistake.

>In future conflicts, defending troops might expect such a tactic and 
>try to prepare accordingly.  Thus, shelters might be made stronger. 

[From] experience, new weapons will be developed to defeat new targets.
The military history is a long history of the development of new weapons  
to defeat new armor.

>Antiaircraft defenses might be more concentrated and better placed 
>for defense. Other tactics might be employed to offset the devestation 
>of massive bombardment.

Iraq already had high concentration of anti-aircraft batteries around 
Baghdad at the start of the war.  Remember all those fireworks over
Baghdad on TV news?  The problem for Iraq is that our planes were 
releasing bombs a good distance away from Baghdad, outside the Iraqi 
air defenses.  What about our cruise missiles that were skimming over
the land?

Furthermore, we had a new weapon up our sleeve: the F-117A Steath Fighter.
Regardless of Iraq's anti-aircraft defense, the F-117As went inside and
destroyed Iraq's most valuable military asset -  the military communication
center.

>In short, the astounding way in which air supremacy affected the outcome
>of the Persian Gulf war may be unique to the theater in which it was 
>fought. It does not necessarily follow that such conditions will be 
>equally relevant in the future. 

Each war is unique.  What is important is how we plan and fight in each 
war.  It would be a serious mistake to fight a war using exactly the
same tactics from other wars that are not appropriate for this war.
For example, the way we fought against Japan in WWII was entirely different 
from the way we fought against Germany.

In the Gulf War, Iraq basically used the same tactics they used against
Iran in the eight-year war.  No wonder why Iraq lost badly.