Path: utzoo!utgpu!news-server.csri.toronto.edu!rpi!think.com!zaphod.mps.ohio-state.edu!wuarchive!uunet!mcsun!ukc!warwick!nott-cs!ucl-cs!news From: G.Joly@cs.ucl.ac.uk (Gordon Joly) Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy Subject: Re: Turing Test: opinions on an idea Message-ID: <1577@ucl-cs.uucp> Date: 29 May 91 11:24:39 GMT Sender: news@cs.ucl.ac.uk Lines: 75 D. Gilman writes >> The model/reality distinction looks to be another version of Searle's >> argument that AI systems merely simulate intelligence and do not >> instantiate it (though I'm not sure about what you're after in >> suggesting that AI models can only *approximate* genuine intelligence). All models are "inexact"; they must be falsifiable. Newton's gravity all that is needed for terrestrial calculation. Some experiments have been performed, but most are done in space. The Einstein view of gravity, General Relativity (GR) is rarely apparent or needed; it did however give reason for the precession of the perihelion of Mercury. There is the lower gravitational field Newtonian limit to GR. Philosophically however, they are poles apart. >> One difference between AI models and the physics models to which you >> refer is that AI models--certain of them at any rate--can be run. What >> Searle has no idea about in claiming that AI simulations are missing >> essential *biological* features of genuine intelligence is just what >> sorts of biological phenomena are essential to thought; without these Penrose claims it is the quantum effects of a real, very compact, bio-system like the brain that gives (human) intelligence/self-awareness. >> it's hard to fathom his conviction about the missing stuff being >> essentially biological. If AI models--running ones--cannot have the >> right stuff (or if, as mere approximations, they cannot have the >> right values) then what exactly is missing, or holding them back? Good question... >> I'm just curious, here. I've got no positive argument on behalf of >> any extant systems. (BTW--it's not just the fact of their being models, >> right? Models can be exemplars, examples of the things they're models >> of) >> >> D. Gilman, Penn State, College of Medicine Fractals pop up all over the place; coastlines and so on. They still models. Therefore, I at loss to see the last point. Take also the roots and discriminant of cubic equations. They popped up in my GR research and also in catastrophe theory. Predator-prey can be applied outside its original field of socio-biology. Here is a quotation from the Editor's Introduction to %A John Von Neumann %T Theory of self-reproducing automata %E Arthur W. Burks %C Urbana %I University of Illinois Press %D 1966 %P 388 ``The scope of the theory of automata and its interdisciplinary character are revealed by a consideration of the the two main type of automata: the artificial and the natural. Analog and digital computers are the most important, but other man-made systems for the communication and processing of information are also included, for example telephone and radio systems. Natural automata include nervous systems, self-reproductive and self-repairing systems, and the evolutionary and adaptive aspects of organisms. ``Automata theory clearly overlaps communications and control engineering on the one hand, and biology on the other. In fact, artificial and natural automata are so broadly defined that one can legitimately wonder what keeps automata theory from embracing both these subjects. Von Neumann never discussed this question, but there are limits to automata theory implicit in what he said.'' ____ Gordon Joly +44 71 387 7050 ext 3716 Internet: G.Joly@cs.ucl.ac.uk UUCP: ...!{uunet,ukc}!ucl-cs!G.Joly Computer Science, University College London, Gower Street, LONDON WC1E 6BT Drop a utensil.