Xref: utzoo comp.multimedia:483 comp.sys.amiga.advocacy:3284 Path: utzoo!utgpu!news-server.csri.toronto.edu!rpi!zaphod.mps.ohio-state.edu!ub!rutgers!cmcl2!sbcs!ameristar!rick From: rick@ameristar (Rick Spanbauer) Newsgroups: comp.multimedia,comp.sys.amiga.advocacy Subject: Re: NeXT/Amiga Multimedia.. Message-ID: <1991May28.100623.266@ameristar> Date: 28 May 91 10:06:23 GMT References: <1991May21.233534.10638@IRO.UMontreal.CA> Distribution: comp Organization: Ameristar Technology, Inc Lines: 24 In article <1991May21.233534.10638@IRO.UMontreal.CA> martin@IRO.UMontreal.CA (Daniel Martin) writes: > His statement is true in at least one way: the NeXT validates the user >and can be "trusted" in a network. This is not yet the case under AmigaDos. >I can set my uid/gid to anything, and have unrestricted access to the mounted >partitions. In our network, we 'restricted' our amigas to 'ftp' and 'login' >(pathetic :-(). > // Daniel Martin Universite de Montreal \\ On an ordinary Unix machine, eg a Sun, it is possible to pretend, using NFS, to be any user one wants to. This requires about as much skill, especially under earlier releases of SunOS, as re-setting the uid/gid in Amiga TCP/IP. It is hard to provide real authentication on a machine that does not have a protected memory address space. I've heard that the PC implementations of NFS have this same problem, even though some use pcnfsd to authenticate a user. Security that is little more than an illusion is perhaps worse at times than no security at all. As I recall the timeline, we've had NFS running on ethernet on the Amiga since roughly 1986. Since I don't follow the NeXT, you can figure out which existed first ;-) Rick