Path: utzoo!utgpu!news-server.csri.toronto.edu!rpi!dali.cs.montana.edu!uakari.primate.wisc.edu!zaphod.mps.ohio-state.edu!wuarchive!cs.utexas.edu!sun-barr!newstop!exodus!appserv!sun!amdcad!amdcad!military From: stevenp@kodak.pa.dec.com (Steven Philipson) Newsgroups: sci.military Subject: Re: Expensive fighters Message-ID: <1991May31.061422.13627@amd.com> Date: 29 May 91 01:18:52 GMT Sender: military@amd.com Organization: Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. Lines: 78 Approved: military@amd.com From: stevenp@kodak.pa.dec.com (Steven Philipson) > Did the Rules of Engagement permit firing on a FLIR contact Yes, for both aircraft and tanks. There were reports from captured Iraqis who said that they heard vehicles approaching, and then their tanks started exploding all around them. They were being hit before they could even see the American forces. It makes sense -- if you can get positive ID with a video image based on some sensor, why should a visual wavelength (i.e, not IR) also be required? >if so why were planes coming back on cloudy days with their bombs still on? Well, sometimes the target is going to be impossible to see even with FLIR. I think that they were using higher minimums when attacking targets in civilian areas, too. >I'm just suggesting that equipment should be chosen to fit the doctrine >that it'll be used to fight under (with flexibility for when doctrine >shifts). Seems reasonable to me, and I think that's consistent with what that general was saying. His point was that the lesson here is that ground attack fighters have to be able to attack under adverse conditions, and be able to dogfight, too, and that this can't be done by a cheap, VFR-only mudfighter. The equipment (multi-role fighters) seems to be completely compatible with the doctrine of positive ID before firing. Do you feel that they are not? > I know the Pentagon loves their state-of-the-art fighters >that push technology and budgets to the wall, This may be a smokescreen, but lately they've been justifying buying high-tech as it's cheaper. The May 6 issue of Av Leak had a comparison of F-16's, F-117s, and B-2's to get a job done. It was pretty wild. There was an attack on Iraqi reactors wherein they used 32 F-16's, escorted by 16 F-15's, plus 12 Wild Weasel's and F-111 jammers, requiring 15 KC-135 tankers for support AND they didn't get the target. They then sent in 8 F-117's with 2 KC-135's and did get it. They say that 2 B-2's would have done it, without support. This may be a plane in search of a mission (the B-2), but it's an interesting argument. The numbers they quoted were that the 60 attack aircraft and 15 tankers cost $6.5 billion, as opposed to the F-117 strike grouping costing $1.5 billion, and "only" $1.3 billion for two B-2s. >to me that pilot training makes the biggest single difference in >performance, That's true in an unassisted air-to-air duel, but that's not the way most encounters have ever gone. Usually the guy that gets shot down never sees his attacker. AWACS enables the friendly fighter get into attack position before the enemy aircraft ever sees him. In an engagement, AWACS allows the friendly fighter to continuously know the position of his adversary. Individual aircraft have to be pointed more or less at their adversary to get a radar track on him. That puts 'em at great disadvantage. In any case, what they were talking about here was not dogfighting, but ground attack. The ability to see a target before it can see you makes a tremendous difference. > training requires air time, and the more expensive the >plane the less time it'll spend in the air training. That's not clear. If an aircraft is expensive to buy, then there will be fewer of them. Training and operational hours are a function of how much they cost to operate though, and these new expensive airplanes are being built with lower maintenance and lower expendable costs as major considerations. >OK, I'm crossing my own boundary on politics, so I'll let myself be rebutted >and then we'll move it to e-mail. Do you really think that this is politics? Sounds like economic and logistical elements of practical military planning and operation. [I've taken my reply to e-mail. --CDR]