Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
Path: utzoo!utgpu!watserv1!watdragon!violet.waterloo.edu!cpshelley
From: cpshelley@violet.waterloo.edu (cameron shelley)
Subject: Re: UNIFIED MODEL FOR KNOWLEDGE REPRESENTATION? (IMPOSSIBLE
Message-ID: <1991Jun14.144150.28239@watdragon.waterloo.edu>
Sender: news@watdragon.waterloo.edu (News Owner)
Organization: University of Waterloo
References: <25348@samsung.samsung.com> <1991Jun14.111857.7374@kingston.ac.uk>
Date: Fri, 14 Jun 1991 14:41:50 GMT
Lines: 37

In article <1991Jun14.111857.7374@kingston.ac.uk> is_s425@kingston.ac.uk (Hutchison C S) writes:
[...]
>Now back to my "rioting blacks"/"racists"/& cet problem.  I assume there is a
>real world out there in which things like "riots", "police", "racists", and so
>on, are possible objects.  The question again is: are reports of events which
>include such terms capable of being true or false?  (I think they are.)  If
>so, how can conflicting reports be true at the same time?  Otherwise, if
>not, why not?

(Assuming your answer to the first question is correct...)

I argue that pragmatics does have a role to play in addressing your
question.  In considering the truth of reports, you must consider why
a speaker might not communicate the truth.  You have been focusing on
inadvertant infelicities alone, but speakers (being agents themselves)
can also lie, that is have reasons to communicate infelicitously.  
Accounting for this requires a model of perlocutionary effects, among
other things.  Since you have dismissed pragmatics and perlocution, you
are denying yourself a criterion for resolving your problem.

(Going back to the first question...)

I agree that the truthfulness of reports is an important question and that
reports can (and should) be judging accordingly.  The pursuit of history is
an example of our interest in the idea.  I think we also agree that "truth"
constitutes a valid relationship between an internal model and perception
of the 'real' world.  However, I don't believe that we can guarantee that
the categorizations we employ in the model itself are valid.  Effective
communication then is only possible with some basic assumptions of common
ground (such as a universal grammar in linguistic theory).

As I indicated, I accept the position that judging the truthfulness of
reports is important and interesting.  I reject the (earlier) implication
that there is an algorithm of establishing such a truth value in the
general case.

				Cam