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From: mcdermott-drew@cs.yale.edu (Drew McDermott)
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
Subject: Re: THE I OF THE BEHOLDER
Message-ID: <1991Jun14.153701.842@cs.yale.edu>
Date: 14 Jun 91 15:37:01 GMT
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  In article <9106140011.AA14996@lilac.berkeley.edu> ISSSSM@NUSVM.BITNET (Stephen Smoliar) writes:
  >In article <1991Jun13.163734.10165@cs.yale.edu> mcdermott-drew@cs.yale.edu
  >(Drew McDermott) writes:
    >>
    >>Okay, but what about this objection: There are no observers, indeed,
    >>but only boundaries imposed by .... who??
    >>
    >>Why do we grant such rock-solid existence to observers and not to
    >>chairs?
    >>
    >>Surely we're not genuflecting toward the almighty self here?
    >>
    >>I think this is a genuine conundrum, but whatever solution we work out
    >>for explaining why people are objectively real will also work for
    >>chairs.  In any case it will not do to say that the reality of
    >>macroscopic objects is merely imposed by an observer, because the
    >>observer is itself just another macroscopic object.

  >However, if we can overcome our fear of solipsism (or at least Chris
  >Hutchison's fear), perhaps the COGITO is not quite as arbitrary as Drew's
  >accusation makes it out to be.  Ultimately, it all boils down to this question
  >of whether or not "genuflecting toward the almighty self" is nothing more than
  >blind faith.  After all, what the COGITO is basically saying is that because I
  >am exercising my "mental powers" (whatever they may be), I can attribute to
  >myself a "rock-solid existence" which I cannot attribute to that chair I
  >observe over there.

The problem is this: It's now becoming clear that the self is a
construct of the brain.  [Okay, clear to a handful of computationally
enlightend people.]  Hence the sentence "I can attribute existence to
myself," actualy means that "the brain can attribute existence to
its 'self' ".  But deciding that the brain itself exists is not
addressed by this formula.

When I question the existence of a macroscopic object, I am not
invoking skepticism.  I'm just following up Minsky's point that
macroscopic objects are not simple collections of microscopic parts
(atoms, e.g.).  A river is not a collection of water molecules,
because the particular molecules involved are always changing.  Let's
call it a "system" of molecules for want of a better term.  The puzzle
is to find the systems in a universe of constantly moving quarks and
leptons.  It won't do to say "Find an observer and let it find the
systems," because the observers are just systems themselves.

  >As I see it, here is where solipsism comes in the door to prop up the COGITO:
  >The question, as Drew formulated it, is quite appropriate.  Why should the
  >class of observers be any better off than the class of chairs?  The answer
  >provided by solipsism is that they are not any better off.  However, there
  >is ONE observer who IS better off;  and that is Drew's "almighty
  self."  

In Descartes' day it might have been plausible to suppose that at
least one observer was directly observed.  But we now realize that the
brain consists of many "observers" (if the term has any meaning) that
apparently conspire to advertise the presence of a single virtual
observer.  This entity, being at best a self-fulfilling hallucination,
is in no position to serve as the foundation of all ontology and
epistemology. 

  >This is a bit convoluted and kind of heady.  It is probably better discussed in
  >a congenial bar over a few beers.  

What isn't?

   As we learn more about the technology of situated automata,
  >it becomes more and more feasible to think of building those machines on a
  >foundation of solipsism.  Indeed, from a point of view of sound engineering,
  >there may be no other viable way in which to build them.

I disagree completely with this idea.  The machines may someday arrive
at a solipsistic position, but if so, it will be false, as we can see
when we start to build them.

                                             -- Drew McDermott