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From: ISSSSM@NUSVM.BITNET (Stephen Smoliar)
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
Subject: RE: THE I OF THE BEHOLDER
Message-ID: <9106150214.AA13451@lilac.berkeley.edu>
Date: 15 Jun 91 02:14:33 GMT
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In article <1991Jun14.153701.842@cs.yale.edu> mcdermott-drew@cs.yale.edu (Drew
McDermott) writes:
>
>When I question the existence of a macroscopic object, I am not
>invoking skepticism.  I'm just following up Minsky's point that
>macroscopic objects are not simple collections of microscopic parts
>(atoms, e.g.).  A river is not a collection of water molecules,
>because the particular molecules involved are always changing.  Let's
>call it a "system" of molecules for want of a better term.  The puzzle
>is to find the systems in a universe of constantly moving quarks and
>leptons.  It won't do to say "Find an observer and let it find the
>systems," because the observers are just systems themselves.
>
>  >As I see it, here is where solipsism comes in the door to prop up the
>  >COGITO:
>  >The question, as Drew formulated it, is quite appropriate.  Why should the
>  >class of observers be any better off than the class of chairs?  The answer
>  >provided by solipsism is that they are not any better off.  However, there
>  >is ONE observer who IS better off;  and that is Drew's "almighty
>  self."
>
>In Descartes' day it might have been plausible to suppose that at
>least one observer was directly observed.  But we now realize that the
>brain consists of many "observers" (if the term has any meaning) that
>apparently conspire to advertise the presence of a single virtual
>observer.  This entity, being at best a self-fulfilling hallucination,
>is in no position to serve as the foundation of all ontology and
>epistemology.
>
Why not?  Where are its points of weakness as far as support is concerned?  As
I understand your argument above, we cannot have either ontology or
epistemology until we have entities.  I am willing to join you in using
the word "systems" for those entities;  and I agree that finding those
systems is basically our "first problem."  Where I do NOT agree is with
your claim that observers are not qualified to find those systems by virtue
of being systems themselves.  Why should this disqualify them?  As I have been
trying to argue to Chris Hutchison, it may create a confusion which can only be
resolved by dialog among those observers;  but all this means is that one set
of hypotheses about what systems are may be displaced by another set.  This
would mean that any foundation we have for ontology and epistemology may not
be strictly static and is highly subjective, but to disqualify it as being a
foundation may be pushing the metaphor of a building's foundation too far.

===============================================================================

Stephen W. Smoliar
Institute of Systems Science
National University of Singapore
Heng Mui Keng Terrace, Kent Ridge
SINGAPORE 0511

BITNET:  ISSSSM@NUSVM

"He was of Lord Essex's opinion, 'rather to go an hundred miles to speak with
one wise man, than five miles to see a fair town.'"--Boswell on Johnson