Path: utzoo!utgpu!news-server.csri.toronto.edu!rpi!usc!pollux.usc.edu!kjh
From: kjh@pollux.usc.edu (Kenneth J. Hendrickson)
Newsgroups: comp.os.minix
Subject: Re: Curses
Message-ID: <33563@usc.edu>
Date: 13 Jun 91 07:27:03 GMT
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In article <}0K*`?+@cck.cov.ac.uk> csg020@uk.ac.cov.cck (***CURTIS***) writes:
>Also, has anyone noticed that if you strings /dev/kmem it shows up everyones
>decrypted password who has logged on since the bring up of the system?!

This is bad.  Not only because ordinary users may be able to find out
the root password (if the superuser isn't so smart), but also because
the superuser is able to find out other users passwords (if he is).

This is a most serious security hole.  It also means that on PC's that
aren't running in protected mode, and maybe Macs, have no security at
all.

Perhaps an easy solution is to have the login program, and the su
program, go and scribble over each copy of entered passwords after they
are used.  Both login and su should be able to do this since they are
both suid.  Any comments on this idea?  Should it go into 1.6.* right
away?

-- 
favourite oxymorons:   student athlete, military justice, mercy killing
Ken Hendrickson N8DGN/6       kjh@usc.edu      ...!uunet!usc!pollux!kjh