Path: utzoo!utgpu!news-server.csri.toronto.edu!rutgers!hsdndev!think.com!snorkelwacker.mit.edu!bloom-picayune.mit.edu!athena.mit.edu!mlevin From: mlevin@athena.mit.edu (Mike Levin) Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy Subject: Re: how many distinct thoughts can a person have? Message-ID: <1991Jun19.173307.10704@athena.mit.edu> Date: 19 Jun 91 17:33:07 GMT References: <1991Jun19.033316.18773@athena.mit.edu> <314@trwacs.UUCP> Sender: news@athena.mit.edu (News system) Distribution: usa Organization: Me, Myself, and I, inc. Lines: 37 In article <314@trwacs.UUCP> erwin@trwacs.UUCP (Harry Erwin) writes: >mlevin@jade.tufts.edu writes: > > >>thoughts is uncountable." Does anyone have any arguments for or >>against the idea that the number of possible distinct human thoughts >>(or mental states) is uncountably infinite? > >The number of distinct human thoughts isn't even countably infinite >in a quantum-mechanical universe, let alone uncountable. However, >if we ignore that argument, the question boils down to whether the >state of the brain is sensitively dependent to its state on a >cauchy surface. I believe Paul Rapp has evidence that it is. So, >although the number isn't infinite, it looks like it's uncountable. > >-- >Harry Erwin >Internet: erwin@trwacs.fp.trw.com I am sorry - I didn't specify the following in my original message. I am not looking for arguments from physics or neurobiology (but if you have an interesting one, let's hear it). I am specifically interested in arguments which do not assume a specific substratum for the mind, nor a specific theory of cognition. I am looking for people's ideas on this question from the point of view of philosophy or perhaps non-physiological psychology. An example of the kind of thing I have in mind: "there are an infinite number of possible objects, and upon considering each one, a person will/will not have a distinct mental state because ...". So I am more interested in arguments stemming from the higher-level concepts of "idea" or "thought" rather than the bottom-up approcah of trying to figure out how many states the brain can have, etc. In asking this question I realize that I am disregarding the behaviorist objection, and also (in trying to make this substratum- and theory-independent) appealing to each person's knowlege of what an idea or thought is. Mike Levin