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From: berry@arcturus.uucp (Berry;Craig D.)
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
Subject: Re: AGAINST FORMALISM?
Keywords: REASONING (is the keyword)!
Message-ID: <1991Jun20.201004.2277@arcturus.uucp>
Date: 20 Jun 91 20:10:04 GMT
References: <549@schoenfinkel.cscs.uwindsor.ca> <1991Jun17.032758.14030@aifh.ed.ac.uk> <553@schoenfinkel.cscs.uwindsor.ca>
Organization: Rockwell International
Lines: 35

wsaba@cscs.uwindsor.ca (Walid Saba) writes:

>In article <1991Jun17.032758.14030@aifh.ed.ac.uk>, cam@aifh.ed.ac.uk (Chris Malcolm) writes:
>> 
>> ...
>> The unfortunate problem with logic is not that it is deficient as a
>> system of reasoning, but that there are so few collections of english
>> language propositions about the world to which it can be usefully
>> applied. Usually it just gives silly results, as in the above example.

>The example I gave is not the test of all tests. Of course, given that
>the `alive' and `female' can not be assumed from `pregnant' (which I
>take it to be your main objection), we would modify our set of inference
>rules... What is the problem?

>My main point was that whatever set of beliefs we have, and however 
>knowledge is representd we do (WE MUST) use some kind of reasoning
>when *processing* this information. [...] 

>So you suggest that it is some *informal* kind of reasoning. Again you 
>missed my point (I think). By "formal" I am suggesting any logic in particular.
>I am also not suggesting that we do have that logic, or know anything
>about. It could turn out to be the LOGIC OF CHEO WAWA... All what I am
>saying is that it must be goverened by certain rules, and if it is the way we
>reason, we must be able to explain certain things using this logic/language...

I have a fundamental objection to refering to our cognitive processes as a
logical system of any type.  A formal logical system must be reproducible -
e.g., if I conclude that "pregnant => female" given my current internal
state today, I should conclude the same thing given the same state at any
other time.  My assertion is that the underlying uncertainties of brain
physiology negate this criterion.  What I had for breakfast could skew
synaptic responses just enough to move around a few truth values, without
any new evidence or such being available.