Path: utzoo!utgpu!news-server.csri.toronto.edu!cs.utexas.edu!convex!swarren
From: swarren@convex.com (Steve Warren)
Newsgroups: comp.unix.amiga
Subject: Re: interesting feature on AMIX..
Keywords: unix security, amix security, setuid
Message-ID: <1991Jun25.143038.22816@convex.com>
Date: 25 Jun 91 14:30:38 GMT
References: <432@hfsi.UUCP> <1991Jun24.173951.17552@convex.com> <436@hfsi.UUCP>
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In article <436@hfsi.UUCP> emcphers@manu.cs.vt.edu (Frank McPherson) writes:
                             [...]
>From what you've already said, I guess that requires asking if it's
>possible to make sure that there are no setuid'd files on the disk, or
>it means ignoring the setuid bit.  Which would be better?  Why would it
>be better?  

Ignoring the setuid would certainly be orders of magnitude simpler to
implement.  Off hand I can't think of any reason a user would need files
that were setuid to himself, since he is already himself.   ;^)

He can't create files that are setuid to anyone else unless he is root, and
no one else is depending on files that are setuid to himself, because his
filesystem is temporary.

Can anyone think of a reason why setuid bits need to be securely enabled (as
opposed to being ignored) on a temporary filesystem like a floppy disk?

--
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--Steve   ._||__
  Warren   v\ *|
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