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From: trc@houti.UUCP (T.CRAVER)
Newsgroups: net.philosophy
Subject: mixing and holding values
Message-ID: <407@houti.UUCP>
Date: Wed, 24-Aug-83 12:42:33 EDT
Article-I.D.: houti.407
Posted: Wed Aug 24 12:42:33 1983
Date-Received: Wed, 24-Aug-83 19:55:50 EDT
Lines: 44

Response to Paul Torek:

Altruism is a moral system that holds the ideal principle for human action
to be exclusively the benefit of others, with no mixing of concern for
self.  On the "spectrum of moral systems of concerned purposes for action", 
this lies at one end, and selfishness at the other.  The intermediate
systems *can* be said to be a mix of the *principles* of altruism and 
selfishness.  

On what *basis* can we declare any intermediate "mixed principles" systems
to be better than the good principle of the two that make it up?  Note that
I am not yet attacking the idea that there can be such a basis - I am 
merely pointing out that you need to provide that basis.  In light of the 
fact that I believe selfishness to be a valid purpose, I will not demand 
that you make that side of the argument.  Rather, I am asking you to supply 
some justification for the principle of benefit to others being a valid 
purpose (whether *equally* valid, or not).  Note that I am asking for a 
*purpose*, not a cause, motivation, etc.  And even if one doesnt assign 
good or bad, the contradictions between the two principles that arise in 
intermediate systems have to be resolved somehow.  How?

I claim that actual purposes can only be based upon *actual values* to ones'
self.  Note that I am not saying one cannot "value someone else benefitting", 
but rather one cannot "hold someone else's value".  The former can be
done by valuing one's pleasure at a loved one's benefiting, for example. 
The latter simply means that you do not experience the other's benefits,
and so cannot *directly* value them, only indirectly, through one's own
benefit that arises because of their benefit.  Have I made the distinction
clear yet?  This is important, because it is a distinction I think you 
have not noticed me making.

As to proof by definition - I do not claim to prove humans have rationality.
I claim that that is obvious.  I claim that I define, on the basis fo that
reality, the term "human" to include "rationality".  I have sent a note
already showing that "jerks" may be a valid definition, but it requires
the more fundamental definition "human".  I agree that applying labels
does not tell one what to do - but that was not what the discussion was
about.  The discussion was about whether it is valid to define "human"
to include "rationality".  Once we have accepted that defintion, we can
use it to say "we are able to be rational, and rationality is good becaues
it works in reality for our survival, so we should be rational".

	Tom Craver
	houti!trc