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Path: utzoo!linus!decvax!ittvax!wex
From: wex@ittvax.UUCP (Alan Wexelblat)
Newsgroups: net.religion
Subject: Re: rights w/o restrictions?
Message-ID: <930@ittvax.UUCP>
Date: Mon, 15-Aug-83 13:45:44 EDT
Article-I.D.: ittvax.930
Posted: Mon Aug 15 13:45:44 1983
Date-Received: Mon, 15-Aug-83 17:07:29 EDT
References: umcp-cs.1610 unc.5698
Lines: 19

Tim has engaged in an interesting evasion (which I'm not sure was deliberate):

He has defined Will as that which does not conflict with the Will of others.
All well and good, except:

Even if I accept this definition of Will, how does it relfect on cases where 
the wants (for lack of a better word) of two people conflict?  How does it
help me decide which person is truly acting under Will, and which is not?

As an instance of what I mean: take the example from my Kant argument.  There 
is an indivisible good which two people desire for (functionally) equivalent
reasons.  How do I determine which of these people gets the good?

I trust that Tim is not trying to say that situations of this sort don't/can't/
shouldn't arise.  I would find that to be a position which needs serious 
defense.

--Alan Wexelblat
decvax!ittvax!wex