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From: andrew@ihlpf.UUCP
Newsgroups: net.religion
Subject: "Re: the case against identical universes - (nf)"
Message-ID: <192@ihlpf.UUCP>
Date: Sat, 27-Aug-83 19:01:30 EDT
Article-I.D.: ihlpf.192
Posted: Sat Aug 27 19:01:30 1983
Date-Received: Tue, 30-Aug-83 04:52:51 EDT
Organization: BTL Naperville, IL
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#R:tekecs:-191300:ihlpf:22600031:  0:2718
ihlpf!dap1    Aug 27 16:40:00 1983

I am familiar with the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle, I just don't believe
it.  I don't want to stir up some big argument over this (admittedly) 
controversial view, but I just don't believe it.  I realize that to most dyed
in the wool physicists this is about like advancing the creationist cause
(which I don't do) but I do have some rather impressive company (Einstein, et.
al.).

Basically, as I understand it (and I don't claim to have any deep insights into
the matter), the Uncertainty Principle claims that the method of inference is
false.  Inference basically says that, all other things being the same, two
identical circumstances will bring about two identical results.  Since we
have always observed the sun to come up in the morning, we expect it to come
up tomorrow morning, barring some cosmic catastrophe.  Since things seem to
drop when we let go of them, we expect them to keep on dropping unless some
opposing force keeps them from doing so.

The Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle says that this is not so.  Given identical
situations (universes) two quarks may act in completely different manners.
Admittedly, it seems to restrict itself to quarks and other such "small"
particles and things, but if we throw out inference in this case, why are we
so confident that it works in the case of the sun, etc.?  About the only thing
that I can see to support such a view is that "Well, inference has always
worked in such situations before".  This is circular reasoning though.
It is inferred from the past successes of inference that it will continue to
work.  So it seems to me that inference must either stand as a whole or fall
as a whole.  Since most of the physical sciences that have made our lives so
wonderful (?) in this modern world rely almost exclusively on inference, I
hesitate to drop it as a principle.  The alternative, as I see it, is to 
assume that the Uncertainty Principle is somewhat akin to Newtonian Physics:
a good model of what we have observed, but one that will eventually be replaced
by a truer model in which inference is restored.

Maybe this should have gone into net.philosophy or net.physics or some other
group, but since it was brought up here, I posted this reply here.  Any
constructive criticism is welcomed, especially since I realize that I am on
the wrong side of the fence as far as most of the scientific community is
concerned.

                                              Darrell Plank
                                              BTL-IH

P.S. I realize that science should not be based on what one "hesitates" or 
"doesn't hesitate" to believe, but the point is, if all of inference is dropped
there's not much to base (physical) science on anyway.