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From: Robert.Frederking%CMU-CS-CAD@sri-unix.UUCP
Newsgroups: net.ai
Subject: Awareness
Message-ID: <12833@sri-arpa.UUCP>
Date: Wed, 19-Oct-83 13:23:59 EDT
Article-I.D.: sri-arpa.12833
Posted: Wed Oct 19 13:23:59 1983
Date-Received: Wed, 26-Oct-83 01:51:32 EDT
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whether human life
should have a special value, beyond its information handling abilities, for
instance for euthanasia and abortion questions. (I certainly don't want to
argue about abortion; personally, I think it should be legal, but not treated
as a trivial issue.)

        At this point, my version of several definitions is in order.  This
is because several terms have been confused, due probably to the
metaphysical nature of the problem.  What I call "awareness" is *not*
"self-reference": the ability of some information processing systems (including
people) to discuss and otherwise deal with representations of themselves.
It is also *not* what has been called here "consciousness": the property of
being able to process information in a sophisticated fashion (note that
chemical and physical reactions process information as well).  "Awareness"
is the internal experience which Michael Condict was talking about, and
which a large number of people believe is a real thing.  I have been
told that this definition is "epiphenominal", in that awareness is not the
information processing itself, but is outside the phenomena observed.

        Also, I believe that I understand both points of view; I can argue
either side of the issue.  However, for me to argue that the experience of
"awareness" consists solely of a combination of information processing
capabilities misses the "dualist" point entirely, and would require me to
deny that I "feel" the experience I do.  Many people in science deny that
this experience has any reality separate from the external evidence of
information processing capabilities.  I suspect that one motivation for this
is that, as Paul Torek seems to be saying, this greatly simplifies one's
metaphysics.

        Without trying to prove the "dualist" point of view, let me give an
example of why this view seems, to me, more plausible than the
"physicalist" view.  It is a variation of something Joseph Weizenbaum
suggested.  People are clearly aware, at least they claim to be.  Rocks are
clearly not aware (in the standard Western view).  The problem with saying
that computers will ever be aware in the same way that people are is that
they are merely re-arranged rocks.  A rock sitting in the sun is warm, but
is not aware of its warmth, even though that information is being
communicated to, for instance, the rock it is sitting on.  A robot next to
the rock is also warm, and, due to a skillful re-arrangement of materials,
not only carries that information in its kinetic energy, but even has a
temperature "sensor", and a data structure representing its body
temperature.  But it is no more aware (in the experiential sense) of what is
going on than the rock is, since we, by merely using a different level of
abstraction in thinking about it, can see that the data structure is just a
set of states in some semiconductors inside it.  The human being sitting
next to the robot not only senses the temperature and records it somehow (in
the same sense as the robot does), but experiences it internally, and enjoys
it (I would anyway).  This experiencing is totally undetectable to physical
investigation, even when we (eventually) are able to analyze the data
structures in the brain.

An interesting side-note to this is that in some cultures, rocks, trees,
etc., are believed to experience their existance.  This is, to me, an
entirely acceptable alternate theory, in which the rock and robot would both
feel the warmth (and other physical properties) they possess.

As a final point, when I consider what I am aware of at any given moment, it
seems to include a visual display, an auditory sensation, and various bits
of data from parts of my body (taste, smell, touch, pain, etc.).  There are
many things inside my brain that I am *not* aware of, including the
preprocessing of my vision, and any stored memories not recalled at the
moment.  There is a sharp boundary between those things I am aware of and
those things I am not.  Why should this be?  It isn't just that the high
level processes, whatever they are, have access to only some structures.
They *feel* different from other structures in the brain, whose information
I also have access to, but which I have no feeling of awareness in.  It
would appear that there is some set of processing elements to which my
awareness has access.  This is the old mind-body problem that has plagued
philosophers for centuries.

To deny this qualitative difference would be, for me, silly, as silly as
denying that the physical world really exists.  In any event, whatever stand
you take on this issue is based on personal preferences in metaphysics, and
not on physical proof.