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From: flink%umcp-cs%CSNet-Relay@sri-unix.UUCP
Newsgroups: net.ai
Subject: re: awareness
Message-ID: <13000@sri-arpa.UUCP>
Date: Sat, 22-Oct-83 19:27:33 EST
Article-I.D.: sri-arpa.13000
Posted: Sat Oct 22 19:27:33 1983
Date-Received: Mon, 31-Oct-83 04:08:11 EST
Lines: 42

From:  Paul Torek <flink%umcp-cs@CSNet-Relay>

            [Submitted by Robert.Frederkind@CMU-CS-SAD.]

[Robert:]

I think you've misunderstood my position.  I don't deny the existence of
awareness (which I called, following Michael Condict, consciousness).  It's
just that I don't see why you or anyone else don't accept that the physical
object known as your brain is all that is necessary for your awareness.

I also think you have illegitimately assumed that all physicalists must be
functionalists.  A functionalist is someone who believes that the mind
consists in the information-processing features of the brain, and that it
doesn't matter what "hardware" is used, as long as the "software" is the
same there is the same awareness.  On the other hand, one can be a
physicalist and still think that the hardware matters too -- that awareness
depends on the actual chemical properties of the brain, and not just the
type of "program" the brain instantiates.

You say that a robot is not aware because its information-storage system
amounts to *just* the states of certain bits of silicon.  Functionalists
will object to your statement, I think, especially the word "just" (meaning
"merely").  I think the only reason one throws the word "just" into the
statement is because one already believes that the robot is unaware.  That
begs the question completely.

Suppose you have a "soul", which is a wispy ghostlike thing inside your body
but undetectable.  And this "soul" is made of "soul-stuff", let's call it.
Suppose we've decided that this "soul" is what explains your
intelligent-appearing and seemingly aware behavior.  But then someone comes
along and says, "Nonsense, Robert is no more aware than a rock is, since we,
by using a different level of abstraction in thinking about it, can see that
his data-structure is *merely* the states of certain soul-stuff inside him."
What makes that statement any less cogent than yours concerning the robot?

So, I don't think dualism can provide any advantages in explaining why
experiences have a certain "feel" to them.  And I don't see any problems
with the idea that the "feel" of an experience is caused by, or is identical
with, or is one aspect of, (I haven't decided which yet), certain brain
processes.
                                --Paul Torek, umcp-cs!flink