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From: dinitz@uicsl.UUCP
Newsgroups: net.ai
Subject: Re: Awareness - (nf)
Message-ID: <3468@uiucdcs.UUCP>
Date: Thu, 27-Oct-83 22:41:51 EST
Article-I.D.: uiucdcs.3468
Posted: Thu Oct 27 22:41:51 1983
Date-Received: Mon, 31-Oct-83 08:11:35 EST
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#R:sri-arpa:-1283300:uicsl:15500011:000:2270
uicsl!dinitz    Oct 27 12:13:00 1983

I'm not so sure that pleasure/pain response will never be analyzable in
physical terms, Robert.  If we were ever to gain a satisfactory
understanding of that property of higher animates -- enough say, to
model it in a robot -- we would also erode the idea that the robot
could not feel or experience other emotional states.  The problem is
that we must not base our arguments concerning robot consciousness,
experience, feeling, selfhood, et cetera on the absence of an adequate
theory to explain the same "phenomena" in humans/animals.

I have placed "phenomena" in scare quotes because of our inability to
define them satisfactorily.  What we really have are words which carry
along vague notions of the way we think our world is.  I hesitate to
call them phenomena, properties, or states until we can pinpoint them
more precisely.

In the end, though, I agree with you that the question is really one of
world-view -- a cultural perspective.  If one begins with the premise
that only higher animates can experience consciousness, then there is no
easy way to infer that plants, rocks or robots can too.  If one begins
with the premise that all earthly objects can experience consciousness,
then there is no question in the special cases of plants, rocks and
robots.  With this second premise the interesting questions are whether
intangibles like words, thoughts, physical states (i.e. temperature),
and time are earthly objects which can hence experience consciousness.

My personal feeling:  The culture I grew up in only allows higher
animates to possess consciousness.  However, I grew up at a time when
the dominant culture was experimenting with various "foreign"
world-views.  Thus there is already some partially charted space in my
head for exceptions.  Outside the context of this discussion, I would
probably say (without hesitation) that robots don't have
consciousness.  Within this context, however, I am willing to admit the
possibility, and discuss the point.  Ultimately, the question has no
relevance at this time, or in my lifetime; I do not worry too much
about what the correct answer is.  In summary, my opinion may be called
the Zen of Robot Consciousness: robot consciousness is possible, and
robot consciousness is not possible.

Rick Dinitz