Relay-Version: version B 2.10 5/3/83; site utzoo.UUCP Path: utzoo!linus!decvax!harpo!eagle!mhuxl!houxm!ihnp4!inuxc!pur-ee!uiucdcs!uokvax!rigney From: rigney@uokvax.UUCP Newsgroups: net.politics Subject: Re: US Casualties - (nf) Message-ID: <3719@uiucdcs.UUCP> Date: Tue, 8-Nov-83 01:08:44 EST Article-I.D.: uiucdcs.3719 Posted: Tue Nov 8 01:08:44 1983 Date-Received: Thu, 10-Nov-83 00:47:46 EST Lines: 40 #R:ihuxm:-66300:uokvax:5000009:000:1611 uokvax!rigney Nov 2 11:36:00 1983 /***** uokvax:net.politics / rabbit!jj / 12:37 am Nov 5, 1983 */ /* ---------- */ In fact, some noted analysts have made the point that when the time comes to use our strategic weaponry, there's no longer any reason to use it. The chief virtue of massive nuclear weaponry lies in deterrence, and if deterrence is to be credible then it is vital that the enemy never feel that the U.S. would be unwilling to reply in force. On a more limited scale, that's one of the reasons presidents don't answer what-if questions; they prefer to keep their options open, and let the enemy have to guess. The greatest danger in espousing a position is if you're not willing to back it up. Japan interpreted the anti-war and isolationist statements of 30's America as an unwillingness to fight a prolonged war, and based their plans on that. But after Japan attacked, the U.S. changed its position with blinding swiftness and went to war anyway. Perhaps if the U.S. had made clear that it wouldn't tolerate Japanese Expansionism from the beginning, a lot of pain could've been avoided. Carl ..!ctvax!uokvax!rigney ..!duke!uok!uokvax!rigney P.S. I wonder how much thought Presidents give to their response to a nuclear strike, anyway. It's clearly important, but just as clearly less probable than the various other concerns that face them. When (IF) the time comes to make the decision, there'll be terribly little time to make it in.