Relay-Version: version B 2.10 5/3/83; site utzoo.UUCP Posting-Version: version B 2.10.1 6/24/83; site ulysses.UUCP Path: utzoo!linus!philabs!seismo!harpo!eagle!mhuxl!houxm!ihnp4!ulysses!smb From: smb@ulysses.UUCP Newsgroups: net.politics Subject: Re: anti-nuke questions Message-ID: <708@ulysses.UUCP> Date: Mon, 21-Nov-83 12:50:22 EST Article-I.D.: ulysses.708 Posted: Mon Nov 21 12:50:22 1983 Date-Received: Wed, 23-Nov-83 03:15:18 EST References: <437@hou5a.UUCP> Organization: AT&T Bell Laboratories, Murray Hill Lines: 90 Rather than trying to answer Tom Craver's questions one by one -- others have done a good job of that (and thanks, Byron, for pointing out that to some of us, peace isn't a new issue. Anyone else remember how the peace symbol originated? It's from the semaphore signals for "ND", meaning "nuclear disarmament") -- I thought I'd describe the philosophical under- pinnings of the freeze movement. I believe that it will answer Tom's questions (which were phrased in a rather loaded fashion, I might add) in a more comprehensive fashion than a straight answer. Supporters of a nuclear freeze have one main objective: preventing a nuclear war, since (in the opinion of many) such a war would quite likely lead to the destruction of the human race. At the very least, civilization as we know it would be totally destroyed. All other objectives are, in a sense, secondary -- corpses can't exercise their rights under a free government -- and all policies must be examined in this light. Note that this means that any all-out war must be averted, since in a conventional war both the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. could easily build new weapons from scratch in a relatively short time. The knowledge of how to build bombs exists and can't be destroyed; we have to live with the nuclear genie out of the bottle. To my way of thinking (and I don't claim that this is true of other freeze advocates), unilaterally abandoning the defense of Western Europe is a very dangerous idea. Some policies are more dangerous than others. Any policy that tempts the other side to launch a nuclear first strike is very dangerous. It doesn't matter much, incidentally, if the temptation exists because of the doubts it creates as to the other side's intentions, or because of inherent properties of the policy. Consider, for example, the MX missile. Its high accuracy makes it usable as a first-strike weapon -- you don't need a 50 meter CPE to wipe out a city, but you do to wipe out a silo. So deploying it creates doubts as to our intentions. Furthermore, given the vulnerabilities of land-based silos to attack, the MX is a "use-or-lose" missile -- it'll only take two or three warheads (probabilistically) to destroy a missile carrying 10 or 12 warheads, which makes them tempting targets for an enemy first strike. But that in turn means that we have to move more towards a launch-on-warning policy, a very dangerous move. In this sense, all MIRVed missile are bad; they increase the payoff of an enemy first strike. In this sense, Midgetman is a "safer" missile, because it's clearly not a first strike weapon, and it's harder to knock out. Another example of a dangerous policy is forward-based weapons, such as Pershing II, European-based ground-launched cruise missile, and SS-20. They're dangerous because they're too vulnerable to being overrun by a quick conventional attack; our bases in West Germany are especially bad. This puts NATO commanders in the position of having to choose between firing nuclear missile too early, and without proper authority, or risk losing them intact to the Soviets. The SS-20s are somewhat less vulnerable, because they're deployed somewhat further back. (If you think I'm implying a need for a better conventional defense of Europe, you're right -- except that I'm not implying it, I'm stating it outright. McNamara and a few others published a long article last year (in Foreign Affairs?) on the feasibility and costs of doing this; they conclude that the incremental cost is zero or low.) Given all this, what policies can we follow to reduce the risk of (nuclear) war? Well, one thing we have to do is reduce doubts about our intentions (and about the Soviets' intentions). Cruise missile are too easily concealed, and hence difficult to verify, but I suspect that they're a genie that's already out of the bottle. Antisatellite weapons are very dangerous, because they pose the threat of blinding the other side's satellites. Encrypted telemetry data is bad, because it creates uncertainty about the other side. An anti-missile system is very bad, because -- given the current MAD balance -- it destroys the other side's deterrent. Look at it this way: if deterrence is the only thing preventing a war now, and you knew that next year, your enemy wouldn't be deterred by your weapons, what would you do? Fire first, while you still could? You may claim that the U.S. wouldn't, but look at it from the Soviets' perspective: why should they believe that of us? Another thing we can do is freeze development of new nuclear weapons. Why? Well, for one thing, it's a powerful symbolic act. We're trying to reduce tensions, remember. I'd actually go a step further and publicly destroy 5-10% of our current stock, and challenge the Soviets to do the same. (This policy is called GRIT, for "graduated reduction in tensions". Who makes up these acronyms, anyway?) It would pose no real danger to our deterrent ability, because -- and this is a crucial point -- our current forces have a tremendous overkill ability. Just one Trident submarine carries enough firepower to destroy more than 100 Soviet cities. "Nuclear parity" is a dangerous buzzword, because it ignores the conept of overkill. This note is long enough, so let me close with an answer to an unasked question: what defense programs do I (or other liberals) support? I can't speak for others, of course, but I'd be satisified if I were presented with a coherent non-MAD strategy. Show me how a new tank, or a larger navy, or a stealth tactical bomber fits in to a larger scheme for non-nuclear defense, and I'll listen. Tell me we need to double our strategic nuclear force and I won't. (A discussion of specific military needs is beyond the scope of this article, but I'd be glad to give my opinions about the idiocies of tanks that don't get 1 mile per gallon, don't run in the dessert, etc., some other time.)