Relay-Version: version B 2.10 5/3/83; site utzoo.UUCP Path: utzoo!linus!security!genrad!grkermit!masscomp!clyde!ihnp4!houxm!hogpc!hogpd!jrrt From: jrrt@hogpd.UUCP (R.MITCHELL) Newsgroups: net.politics Subject: Re:Re: Accidental Launches Message-ID: <233@hogpd.UUCP> Date: Mon, 19-Dec-83 15:53:20 EST Article-I.D.: hogpd.233 Posted: Mon Dec 19 15:53:20 1983 Date-Received: Tue, 20-Dec-83 06:54:22 EST Lines: 174 Dan Duval claims that I have "missed the point, and trailed a number of misleading if not downright false statements along with it" in my discussion of accidental launches from nuclear submarines. I confess to being vague in spots, as I will be below, since there are some things I just cannot talk about in detail. In those areas I state my opinion but do not back it up with facts. Apologies if that is not satisfactory; you're certainly within your rights to disbelieve anything I say. I suggest, though, that as a former Weapons Officer on an SSBN submarine, I am a knowledgeable source of information. ************************************************************************** The point is not that each sub crew is looking for an opportunity to launch their missiles the first chance they get, but rather that it is possible for them to launch without authorization from the US. There's a grain of truth in that. Nothing is perfect, and occasionally one unstable individual slips through the psychological testing and monitoring. But *so many* people are needed simultaneously to launch a missile, that the probability of having that many people, in the same sub, in the right positions, exposed to the right presssures, is vanishingly small. A much more likely hazard is human error in the Pentagon, or the Kremlin. ****************************************************************************** For one thing, the Failsafe system prevents the launch of ground-based missiles and the arming of airborne weapons as long as communications are maintained-- if any unit is out of communications, there are procedures to launch anyway. I can neither confirm nor deny the existence of procedures for self-initialized missile launch by US submarines. (That's a CYA line). ****************************************************************************** Submarines are more likely to be out of communications than airplanes and missile control sites, because their very nature is to hide from electro- magnetic detection as well as sight and sound detection. This often means diving deeper than reliable short-wavelength radio communication depths. The only real electro-magnetic detection threat to a sub is when part of it is above water. When it is submerged, even at periscope depth, E-M radiation is not a worry. Anything frequency high enough to detect the boat with any resolution will be too high to penetrate the water. *********************************************************************** In peacetime, an SSBN can cruise shallow and listen to the Bowl games, but in wartime (DEFCON 1) or when war is imminent(DEFCON 2), shallow running subs are risking detection by a hostile force. There is no effective radio communications at 100 meters down... The only difference between threats to subs during DEFCON 1 and those during DEFCON 5 (peace and serenity) is that when the Bad Guys find you during DEFCON 1, they shoot at you. It seems good common sense, therefore, during DEFCON Anything, for subs to continually practice the furtive procedures that they'd have to adopt during DEFCON 1. Also, there *are* effective radio communications at 100 meters down, if you know how to listen... ************************************************************************* I am not saying that I believe the average naval officer is looking for a chance to launch missiles. I don't believe the average naval officer is going to commit suicide, either, but some do. My contention is that we can reduce the amount of discretion the average naval officer has to do something which risks everyone. I agree with all those statements, but I dispute your conclusion. The Average Naval Officer has precious little discretion as it is in such matters, reducing that discretion further would totally eliminate his ability to perform his job when he *was* authorized to do so. The logical extreme of your position would be to have the physical triggering signal come direct from the Joint Chiefs to the missiles, bypassing those indiscrete AVOs. ************************************************************************ The contention that the use of nuclear weapons on subs is "preposterous", is itself rather silly. The Soviet FRAS 1 system mounted on the Kievs and Moskvas is an anti-submarine system which does not have a version without a nuclear warhead, and the SS-N-15...also has a nuclear warhead... These tend to suggest that someone somewhere believes nuclear weapons are effective against subs. These are valid points. They represent a key difference between the US and Soviet Navies. Ours has better electronics, etc, and so can pinpoint a target and deliver a payload closer to that target, than can theirs. To compensate, they put bigger bangs in their torpedoes and missiles. The extra bang, in my opinion, is not worth the extra buck. I suspect the US Navy agrees, since the Mk 45 torpedo, the only torpedo with nuclear-capability in our arsenal, has been phased out in favor of the conventionally armed Mk 48. So, yes, someone somewhere does believe nuclear weapons may be useful against subs, but only if the alternative is throwing rocks. ************************************************************************** ...the fact of attack puts the entire mission of the sub at danger, and increases the tension the crew is going to be under, increasing the chance of them making a mistake. Undeniably true, but the mistakes will be made as the sub tries to locate and avoid/destroy the enemy. If the sub simultaneously received a launch message and was attacked, guess what the sub commander would worry about first. Look at it this way; if he stopped to launch his missiles (which takes more than a few minutes), his attacker will destroy him before one bird takes off. Clearly, he must run away or fight first. Therefore, to worry about the crew falsely launching because of the pressures of a local attack, is unnecessary. It won't happen. ************************************************************************** Besides, a 20kt nuclear explosion 1 mile away, even through the water, is going to cause a radio-frequency pulse that the sub should be able to detect -- it won't kill the sub, but I find it hard to believe the crew could not figure out whether it was nuclear or not. If your soundman reports a splash in the water 2 miles away and the sub shakes, you might safely conclude it was not a conventional depth charge that exploded. I'm not a physicist; you may be right about an EMP being able to penetrate the water to hit the sub. But I'm not sure; if so, I'd think the Navy would be maintaining their supply of nuclear torpedoes. But I could be wrong. For the record, a sonarman could tell you the bearing to a noise source, and its relative strength in decibels, but he would in general not be able to tell you the distance to the source. (Depending on local ocean conditions -- depth, salinity, and temperature, once in a while you can get a shrewd guess. Very rarely). ************************************************************************* ...The SSBN-643, of the Benjamin Franklin class, must, according to the GAO, reset their inertial guidance system every 40 hours. Therefore, anyone around to see them has every possibility to do so. Not correcting the inertial guidance system threatens the mission of the sub, as an error of 20 km in launch position makes at least 20 km of error at the target. All true statements, as far as they go. First, the SINS (Ship's Inertial Navigation System; the kind onboard the 640-class) is a very reliable piece of gear -- specs are of course classified but the amount of drift in 40 hours is *MUCH* less than 20 km. Getting a navigational satellite fix does not require surfacing, although it does require the sub to put the navigation mast (basically an antenna mounted like a periscope) above the water. This is indeed a relatively risky operation from a security point of view, but a thin mast has a much smaller radar profile than does an entire surfaced sub. Finally, there are other ways to get navigational fixes that do not require putting anything above the surface. These alternatives are very safe for the sub. ************************************************************************* ... if American subs are so hard to detect, why are American attack subs assigned to shadow the Soviet attack subs that shadow our SSBNs, eh? If they can't find us, they can't track us, no? Fair question, but consider these points. I object to the implication that our SSBNs are regularly trailed by Soviet subs. Details are classified, but such trailings are very rare. If nothing else, we'd hear them coming for us long before he could hear us, so we could maneuver away from him. Our sub base locations are known to anyone. The approximate ranges of our missiles, the number of subs, our crew rotation policies, submerged transit velocities, etc. are all either unclassified or are presumably known by the Soviets. Therefore, they can predict fairly easily when and where a US SSBN will leave port to go out on patrol. If they want, they could easily station one or more of their subs just outside the territorial limit, to intercept the SSBN as it heads out. It is within the realm of possibility that our SSNs are sometimes stationed to intercept Them before They intercept us. This would be especially credible if the US Navy were able to track Soviet subs fairly easily, and knew if/when someone was out there waiting for the SSBN. Soviet boats are notoriously noisy... *************************************************************************** This entire discussion comes down to whether the subs can communicate or not, and currently, there is every reason to believe not -- and this is a chance to make an error. What we need to do is reduce the chances of error. Dan, I agree that this is the crux of the debate. I strongly disagree with your conclusion. Personal experience on the boats, my training, and my (admittedly fallible) understanding of the way the world works, tells me that the subs may not always get the launch signal when they should, but that if the signal is sent, the subs will get it and launch appropriately. If the signal is not sent, I am convinced that no launch will occur. The only chance for error that needs reducing is the possibility of a pre-emptive strike so quick that a retaliatory message never gets sent. And the best way to minimize that error, it seems to me, is to make it unnecessary by eliminating the need for it. But until that time, I will secure that we no launch until occur until The Powers That Be say so.