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From: rigney@uokvax.UUCP
Newsgroups: net.politics
Subject: Re: Re: An alternative to TDA - (nf)
Message-ID: <4618@uiucdcs.UUCP>
Date: Sun, 18-Dec-83 22:53:05 EST
Article-I.D.: uiucdcs.4618
Posted: Sun Dec 18 22:53:05 1983
Date-Received: Wed, 21-Dec-83 01:26:25 EST
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#R:rayssd:-31000:uokvax:5000043:000:1254
uokvax!rigney    Dec 16 16:54:00 1983

Is this a question, or statement, or argument, or what?   In  THE
THIRD  WORLD  WAR:AUGUST  1985  (which  I  assume  is what you're
talking about), Nato has improved its conventional forces a great
deal,  and is barely able to hold the Soviet attack.  The Soviets
bog down, and decide to apply pressure by obliterating Birmingham
with a 1-megaton missile, with advance notification so NATO won't
think it's the beginning of a general attack.

The U.S. and Great Britain promptly respond with  4  missiles  on
Minsk,  and the Soviet Union backs off rapidly.  The pressures of
the war and the attack eventually  lead  to  the  Soviet  Union's
collapse, with widespread uprisings and riots.

In the follow-up book, THE THIRD WORLD WAR: THE UNTOLD STORY,  we
see  the viewpoint of the Soviet Politburo as they decide whether
to use nuclear weapons at the start of the invasion,  and  if  so
how  many and on whom.   They decide that they must either strike
with everything, or nothing.  Fear of American retaliation  leads
them to choose to fight without nukes.  The point is raised again
two weeks into the war, when things are not looking  as  well  as
hoped;  the  attack  on  Birmingham is chosen to test the will of
NATO.

	Carl
	..!ctvax!uokvax!rigney