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From: edhall%rand-unix@sri-unix.UUCP
Newsgroups: net.unix-wizards
Subject: Re:  Re:  Access rights for suid programs. - (nf)
Message-ID: <14944@sri-arpa.UUCP>
Date: Sat, 24-Dec-83 03:54:00 EST
Article-I.D.: sri-arpa.14944
Posted: Sat Dec 24 03:54:00 1983
Date-Received: Sat, 31-Dec-83 01:12:19 EST
Lines: 13

Concerning your problem with emulating the USG suid mechanism on non-
suid programs: I once accomplished this sort of thing by having the
program spawn a child process which setuid()'d back to the real UID,
leaving the parent to clean up after the child died.  Of course, the
parent must be very careful with signals and the whole thing isn't
the most efficient technique in the world, but with vfork() things
aren't quite so bad.

Now, if UNIX had coroutines...          :-)

		-Ed
		edhall@rand-unix.ARPA
		decvax!randvax!edhall.UUCP