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From: chris@grkermit.UUCP (Chris Hibbert)
Newsgroups: net.physics
Subject: Re: this is the article on Hume
Message-ID: <685@grkermit.UUCP>
Date: Tue, 17-Jan-84 16:13:33 EST
Article-I.D.: grkermit.685
Posted: Tue Jan 17 16:13:33 1984
Date-Received: Wed, 18-Jan-84 07:10:01 EST
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I'm going to nitpick since you (laura) say that you are trying to
polish this argument.  You said:

	"The memory stores sense impressions. So there are sense impressions
	and the memory of sense impressions. So what does one do? One posits
	an "I" that connects these memories together. This is called self-
	consciousness. Anything with a memory also has a self-conscious by
	this model. So where Descartes was able to say that animals cannot
	feel pain because they do not have a thinking mind, Hume cannot.
	Animals have a memory, therefore they have a self-conscious. (I
	actually think that it was Berkeley who went on about this, not Hume.)"

Between "This is called self-consciousness." and "Anything with a
memory also has a self-conscious by this model." you seem to have lost
track of your statement that the "I" is what "connects these memories
together."  I would argue that having a memory isn't sufficient.  The
mind that operates on the memory must contain some concept of the
importance of the connection between the memories.  Merely being aware
of the various parts isn't enough; there has to be a level of
abstraction that says they are all part of some single thing.

I can't speculate about what Descartes, Hume and Berkeley thought about
animals being self-conscious, but I would say that some are and some
aren't.  The difference would have to depend on whether their actions
and plans include themselves as a factor.  For instance, a dog that
can't figure out why its itchy tail keeps moving away as it is chased,
doesn't seem to have a concept of itself as a discrete agent.