Relay-Version: version B 2.10 5/3/83; site utzoo.UUCP Posting-Version: version B 2.10.1 exptools 1/6/84; site ihuxr.UUCP Path: utzoo!watmath!clyde!burl!we13!ihnp4!ihuxr!pem1a From: pem1a@ihuxr.UUCP (Tom Portegys) Newsgroups: net.ai,net.philosophy Subject: Re: New topic for discussion Message-ID: <1064@ihuxr.UUCP> Date: Thu, 3-May-84 19:55:34 EDT Article-I.D.: ihuxr.1064 Posted: Thu May 3 19:55:34 1984 Date-Received: Sat, 5-May-84 00:23:03 EDT Organization: AT&T Bell Labs, Naperville, IL Lines: 49 Phaedrus' article made me think of a story in the book "The Mind's Eye", by Hofstadter and Dennett, in which the relationship between subjective experience and physical substance is explored. Can't remember the story's name but good reading. Some other thoughts: One aspect of experience and substance is how to determine when a piece of substance is experiencing something. This is good to know because then you can fiddle with the substance until it stops experiencing and thereby get an idea of what it was about the substance which allowed it to experience. The first reasonable choice for the piece of substance might be yourself, since most people presume that they can tell when they are having a conscious experience. Unfortunately, being both the measuree and measurer could have its drawbacks, since some experiments could simulaneously zap both experience and the ability to know or not know if an experience exists. All sorts of problems here. Could you just THINK you were experiencing something, but not really? What this calls for, it seems to me, is two people. One to measure and one to experience. Of course this would all be based on the assumption that it is even possible to measure such an elusive thing as experience. Some people might even object to the notion that subjective experiences are possible at all. The next thing is to choose an experience. This is tricky. If you chose self-awareness as the experience, then you would have to decide if being self-aware in one state is the same as being self-aware in a different state. Can the experience be the same even if the object of the experience is not? Then, a measuring criterion would have to be established whereby someone could measure if an experience was happening or not. This could range from body and facial expressions to neurological readings. Another would be a Turing test-like setup: put the subject into a box with certain I/O channels, and have protocols made up for measuring things. This would allow you to REALLY get in there and fiddle with things, like replacing body parts, etc. These are some of the thoughts that ran through my head after reading the Phaedrus article. I think I thought them, and if I didn't, how did this article get here? Tom Portegys, Bell Labs, ihlpg!portegys (ihlpg currently does not have netnews, that's why this is coming from ihuxr).