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From: rrizzo@bbncca.ARPA (Ron Rizzo)
Newsgroups: net.philosophy
Subject: Re: A topic for discussion, phil/ai pers - (nf)
Message-ID: <723@bbncca.ARPA>
Date: Thu, 17-May-84 17:13:01 EDT
Article-I.D.: bbncca.723
Posted: Thu May 17 17:13:01 1984
Date-Received: Fri, 18-May-84 03:34:46 EDT
References: <177@ism780.UUCP>
Organization: Bolt, Beranek and Newman, Cambridge, Ma.
Lines: 11

There's a fourth type of person: one who doesn't know if humans are
machines and who can't hold any of the 3 beliefs.

The "problem of object identification" is merely a synonym for the
"problem of machine perception".  The adequacy of a scheme of descrip-
tion for an object depends on what you want the machine to DO with that
object.  The problem is we not only lack ingenious descriptive schemes
for objects for performing even simple perceptual
for even simple perceptual skills, but we don't really know (in explicit
rigorous terms) what these skills are that make human perception possible.