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From: lorien@dartvax.UUCP (Lorien Y. Pratt)
Newsgroups: net.philosophy
Subject: Re: infinite regressions
Message-ID: <1692@dartvax.UUCP>
Date: Fri, 25-May-84 17:23:40 EDT
Article-I.D.: dartvax.1692
Posted: Fri May 25 17:23:40 1984
Date-Received: Fri, 1-Jun-84 03:15:47 EDT
References: <1382@cbosgd.UUCP>
Distribution: net
Organization: Dartmouth College
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I think you're running up against the traditional difficulty with
"doing" psychology well enough so that it's reproducible:  the
functions of mind that can be consciously introspected aren't
necessarily at the appropriate level for modeling the mind.

In other words, though we appear to think via words, a verbal model is
rotten for building cognitive models.  So Chomsky and others proposed
models based on logic that were one level deeper -- in terms of
symbols.  As scientists, we can follow the connection between this
symbolic level and behavioral/introspective results.  But what if the
proper level to model brain function is much deeper?  We'll have to
develop translation functions between the low-level "language" of the
brain and our conscious observations in order to validate our
theories.  This is an enourmously complex problem.

I don't see how the (which?) "uncertainty" principle has much to do
with it.  I realize the above is a tangeant to your tangeant, though.

      --Lorien Y. Pratt
	Dartmouth College Library
	Hanover, NH  03755

	decvax!dartvax!lorien