Relay-Version: version B 2.10 5/3/83; site utzoo.UUCP
Posting-Version: version B 2.10.1 6/24/83; site duke.UUCP
Path: utzoo!watmath!clyde!burl!ulysses!unc!mcnc!duke!nlt
From: nlt@duke.UUCP (N. Tinkham)
Newsgroups: net.religion
Subject: Looking under Rosen's rocks
Message-ID: <4286@duke.UUCP>
Date: Wed, 2-May-84 11:48:02 EDT
Article-I.D.: duke.4286
Posted: Wed May  2 11:48:02 1984
Date-Received: Thu, 3-May-84 08:44:14 EDT
Organization: Duke University
Lines: 57

ROSEN:
>Aren't the chemicals in one's brain and body subject to those same
>physical laws that govern billiard balls.  (Or rather, isn't their motion
>described by those same physical laws?)  To say that the brain and body of
>a person are not within the same realm of physical law is to make a very
>bold assumption.  What is the reason for even thinking of making such an
>assumption?  Is there some facet of human existence that is unexplained
>by the same physical laws that govern "inanimate" objects?

NORRIS:
>I do not like what I find when I carry this reasoning to its logical
>conclusion.  Are murder and rape then justifiable as a particular mixture of
>chemicals and electrical impulses in our brain, none of which we are
>responsible for?  By the same token, are virtues such as patience, love,
>or gentleness not to be rewarded for the same reason?

ROSEN:
>David has absolutely hit the nail on the head with this one.  What's more, he's
>shown that what I've thought all along about the nature of religion is probably
>true.  HE DOESN'T LIKE WHAT HE FINDS WHEN HE CARRIES THIS REASONING TO ITS
>LOGICAL CONCLUSION!!  HE DOESN'T LIKE THE NOTION THAT MURDER AND RAPE AND
>PATIENCE AND LOVE RESULT FROM CHEMICAL PROCESSES!  HE DOESN'T LIKE THE NOTION
>OF A UNIVERSE WITHOUT ULTIMATE REWARD/PUNISHMENT!

>So what David do?  Since he doesn't like it, he figures it *can't* be this way.
>The universe must be the way *he* perceives it, and since strict ratioanalism
>produces a world that he doesn't like the shape of, he designs a new one.

   David Norris is quite capable of providing his own defense, but since
the entire "nature of religion" (ahem) is at stake, I'd like to comment
on Rich Rosen's statement above.

   Perhaps the wording "I do not like what I find..." was unfortunate.
At any rate, it seems to have been misinterpreted.  If I understand
David correctly, he's not trying to say that the idea of an entirely
material world is unpleasant (though it might be), but rather that
such an assumption has implications which are contrary to his perceptions;
it is these apparent contradictions rather that mere unpleasantness
which make materialism seem inadequate.

   Actually, the statement "the universe must be the way *he* perceives
it" is not far off, if you'll take the emphasis off the "he".  Of course
any or all of our perceptions may be illusory; but in attempting to
describe the world, it seems reasonable to favor a description which
accounts for as many of our strongest perceptions as possible.  Now,
many (perhaps not all) of us have a strong intuitive idea of morality:
that it is meaningful, e.g., to say "murder is wrong", and that such
a statement means more than just "my mother/Sunday School teacher/government
forbids murder" or "I find murder repulsive".  Materialism seems to
imply that this intuition of good and evil is illusory.  And perhaps it
is.  But a theory which better provides for morality will be more
satisfying to those of us who are convinced that there is genuine good and
evil in the world.


                                            N. Tinkham
                                            duke!nlt