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From: nlt@duke.UUCP (N. Tinkham)
Newsgroups: net.religion
Subject: More on materialism
Message-ID: <4295@duke.UUCP>
Date: Thu, 3-May-84 22:39:43 EDT
Article-I.D.: duke.4295
Posted: Thu May  3 22:39:43 1984
Date-Received: Fri, 4-May-84 07:23:33 EDT
Organization: Duke University
Lines: 46

The story so far:

   Rich Rosen has been arguing for materialism [i.e., the view that the
universe and all its phenomena are composed of or due to matter alone]
and asked for any counterevidence to support the view that mind exists
separately from (or distinct from) matter.  David Norris offered the
common human idea of morality as such counterevidence.  Rosen accused
Norris of constructing a world view to fit the way he (Norris) wants
to see the world, and I stepped in to draw a distinction between one's
perceptions of the world and one's preferences regarding the world.
   [There.  If I've represented everyone fairly, then I've successfully
eliminated about a page of quotes.  Now then:]

   In response to my statement that there are apparent contradictions between
the implications of materialism and human perceptions [of morality],
R. Rosen asks:  "What are these contradictions and implications?"  I'll
try to make my point more clearly.  There are several basic intuitions
or perceptions which seem to be common to many, if not most or all, humans,
which cannot be proven but nevertheless are so persistent that it generally
takes great effort to explain them away or live as though they were false
perceptions.  Among these are (to state it in the first person): 1) that
I exist; 2) that other minds exist; 3) that the material world exists,
as matter, not merely as a manifestation of mind; 4) that deductive logic
can be applied to the world to yield true (sound) statements about the
world; 5) that some actions are morally good and some morally evil,
that it is meaningful to speak of good and evil.  It is this last intuition
that we are addressing.
   The claim is being made that materialism does not provide sufficient
grounds for morality.  To state it personally:  I do not find, in a
materialistic world view, a reason to judge one act good and another
bad.  Physical and chemical processes are generally regarded as neutral,
having neither malice nor good will and thus not moral agents; it is
thus not clear to me why physical and chemical processes occurring in
a human brain and body can be termed good or evil.
   If you know of a good argument for a basis of morality within materialism,
then present it now and we'll discuss it.  (I may easily have overlooked
something.)  If not, then this stands as counterevidence against materialism,
as was requested.  (No, of course it's not *disproof*.  Counterevidence.)
   Note that I have not appealed to the way I wish the world to be.  That
is not relevant to this argument.


"This must be Thursday.  I never could get the hang of Thursdays."

                                       N. Tinkham
                                       duke!nlt