Relay-Version: version B 2.10 5/3/83; site utzoo.UUCP Path: utzoo!watmath!clyde!burl!ulysses!mhuxl!houxm!ihnp4!zehntel!hplabs!sdcrdcf!sdcsvax!akgua!mcnc!decvax!cca!ima!ism780b!jim From: jim@ism780b.UUCP Newsgroups: net.philosophy Subject: Re: Re: B.F. Skinner (and dead Greeks) - (nf) Message-ID: <22@ism780b.UUCP> Date: Wed, 25-Jul-84 00:24:11 EDT Article-I.D.: ism780b.22 Posted: Wed Jul 25 00:24:11 1984 Date-Received: Fri, 27-Jul-84 06:31:21 EDT Lines: 48 #R:ecsvax:-285700:ism780b:27500013:000:2794 ism780b!jim Jul 17 23:27:00 1984 > Given this model, thinking is pretty inefficient. However, if I am not > determined then thinking is a pretty useful thing! This is extremely philosophically naive. If it is determined, than it is determined, and issues like efficiency are irrelevant. The deterministic model says that it was determined that objects with big brains which involved extremely complex chemical processes which resulted in extremely complex and varied responses to complex and massive external influences would come into existence inexorably as the workings out of the constraining relationships among particles (or probability waves or whatever) governed by physical laws. From the evolutionary view, big brains were selected for species survival and all this contemplating the naval and ability to build atom bombs just came along as a side-effect, much like writing a programming language to solve a bunch of mathematical problems just happened to provide a tool to solve a lot of other problems as well. For a fuller understanding of this non-pan-selectionist (that is, not all traits are a direct result of natural selection) view, read Stephen Jay Gould. (Darwin himself was not a pan-selectionist, he was not a "social Darwinist", he did not believe in nor coin the phrase "survival of the fittest"; it is amazing how widely these Fascist (Conrad Lorentz, anyone?) beliefs are held. People apparently believe them because they *want* to.) > The question is -- am I totally determined into having the thoughts that > I am having now by my genes and my environment...or is there a ``me'' > there which could think about something different if I chose to? But what is the nature of this choosing? If there is only one future, there is only one future, and so all your behavior and thoughts are "pre-determined". My favorite model is the multiple-worlds view, which holds that for each quantum-decision point there is a reality split, and while many choices are possible from a given brain-state, "this" you is the one defined by its particular past. But this model isn't really any less deterministic than the single-path view. And none of this affects whether or not you have free will. The degree to which you have free will is the degree to which your future actions cannot be predicted, not the degree to which some mechanism to which you have no access will produce them. The real problem is that the notions of "free will" and "determinism" are so deeply rooted in semantics, that is language, that is a construct of the human mind, that is something governed by the laws of the universe be they deterministic or no, that it is impossible to separate them out and study them free-standing. They must be understood in light of the way we think about about them. -- Jim Balter (ima!jim)