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From: chongo@nsc.UUCP (Landon C. Noll)
Newsgroups: net.crypt
Subject: Re: Has DES been broken
Message-ID: <1823@nsc.UUCP>
Date: Sat, 3-Nov-84 23:17:14 EST
Article-I.D.: nsc.1823
Posted: Sat Nov  3 23:17:14 1984
Date-Received: Sun, 4-Nov-84 22:39:31 EST
References: <120@frog.UUCP> <5527@brl-tgr.ARPA>
Organization: National Semiconductor, Sunnyvale
Lines: 55


> P.S.  If anyone from the NSA wants to give me a hard time about
> this discussion, let me remark that everything I have said can be
> obtained from unclassified sources.  I think it is to the general
> benefit of everyone except perhaps the cryptographic agencies to
> work toward demonstrably secure cryptosystems for commercial use.


Folks who know about the multi-speak one goes through to say:

    "I neither confirm, nor deny, nor to admit that public comment
     should, or should have not been said for national security reasons."

can understand why people smell a rat in the DES system.  The NSA would not
admit to the fact that the DES has a trapdoor (so they can read the other guys
messages in case they use it), NOR would the NSA admit that the DES is very
secure (in case the other guys actually fear that the NSA did have a trapdoor
and thus not use it while domestic traffic is secure from the other guys).
On the other hand, the NSA might act in such a way as to indirectly admit
the truth (the other guys think the NSA wants to fake them out, so they reject
the truth), or indirectly give out dis-information (the other guys suspect
a double-switch so...).  Anyway you get the idea..  [Note: the term: other guys
is used as a generic term]


The net sum of the above kind of system is:

	"If in doubt, don't count on it going your way.  If dealing
	 with security, then doubt.  Therefore don't count on it!"

This rule need not apply to encryption of your christmas wish list to mommy,
but it might be useful for sending your all your money over a wire.  Then
again of you always encrypt everything, you wont forget to encrypt things of
value, nor will you call attention to an secure message when you need one!
But then again if you encrypt everything, you might call attention to youself
to such a degree that the other guys try to break all your messages!


I think it would be good for the NSA to come out with some testable
justification of the DES system.  Maybe the folks at arrowwan.UUCP might
like to comment or help clear the air on this, but I am not going to wait
until they do.  


Last, let me refer readers to the President's letter on the Communications
of the ACM for the past 3 years in regards to the damage National Security
has done to research.  There is a price paid for National Security, and there
is a value gained by it.  Discussions about the net result are best done
on net.politics.


chongo <the text of this article is actually encrypted> /\??/\
-- 
    "Don't blame me, I voted for Mondale!"
				John Alton 85'