Relay-Version: version B 2.10 5/3/83; site utzoo.UUCP
Posting-Version: version B 2.10.1 6/24/83; site ucf-cs.UUCP
Path: utzoo!watmath!clyde!burl!ulysses!unc!mcnc!duke!ucf-cs!yiri
From: yiri@ucf-cs.UUCP (Yirmiyahu BenDavid)
Newsgroups: net.religion.jewish
Subject: Interpretations
Message-ID: <1612@ucf-cs.UUCP>
Date: Wed, 24-Oct-84 11:16:22 EDT
Article-I.D.: ucf-cs.1612
Posted: Wed Oct 24 11:16:22 1984
Date-Received: Fri, 26-Oct-84 09:26:24 EDT
Organization: UCF, Orlando, FL
Lines: 123

Robert Shnidman brings out some good points. I think that some
of them also need to be questioned in greater depth however.

The point regarding the performance of 'any activity prohibited
by Torah on Shabbat [ed] even indirectly' is well made and I
agree. Further, his point was well stated that 'if it is your
specific intention to perform a prohibited activity, then per-
forming that activity even indirectly ...' would transgress
Torah. My departure however, is that phrases such as 'it is
not allowed', 'it is prohibited', 'it is permitted', and the
like seem more like a mechanical regurgitation of Talmud to
me that a thought-out rational for accepting the assertion.
Mechanical regurgitation of rules can be programmed into a
machine, it doesn't take human intelligence. With new learning
and new input over time, my feeling is that the rabbinic 
'rules' should be re-examined to verify that they are indeed
in line BOTH with Torah (written) AND the latest learning and
knowledge. But what I see is simply a regurgitation of those
'rules' unquestioningly. In my opinion, we could eventually
find ourselves in a situation similar to the Christians who
are debating over whether Galileo should be forgiven for his
heresies - since he was right. Knowledge is the cornerstone
of Judaism.

In Temple times, we were a people of Torah, today we seem to
be a people of Talmud. I'm persuaded this is not an improve-
ment. It is also no simple question since the determination
of mishpat by authorities is clearly ordered in Torah. This
was done quite differently in Temple times however. History
should have great weight in the analysis of the issue. (It
would be an error to attribute the difference simply to the 
presence of the Temples - since this was also true during 
the Babylonian exile.)

Torah states that these things are not in the heavens that
we need somebody to travel to Mars for them, nor in the 
depths of the sea that we need some super submarine, etc.
We don't need sages to tell us what Torah means. Any Jew
can read it and learn it without an intermediary to ex-
plain it to him. What we do need are authorities who will
interpret those laws in terms of applications to specific
cases, establish precedence/case law (mishpat) and enforce
the law to protect the observant from those who would
take advantage of them. But legislation of new law is
forbidden by Torah, hence the imposition of 'safety
fences' (and rabbinic decree when it falls into that
category) would be clearly transgressing Torah. When
rabbinic decree comes under the category of mishpat, then
it has the same force as Torah and so no distinction should
be made as to whether it was the written Torah or the mishpat
authorized by written Torah which was transgressed - in 
either case Torah was transgressed.

It seems to me that any scholarly discussion should deal
with these questions rather than simply regurgitate rules
which anyone could simply look up for themselves in Talmud
if that was all there was to it (and much of it simply by
referencing the Shulkhan Arukh).

When examining the basis for the rules, the basis should
also be examined. For example, Robert gives us several
grounds for the rules he references (which was also well
done since he did not rely solely on regurgitating rules),
but the assertion that 'heating a metal to incandescence
even without combustion is considered fire', begs the
question. Who considers it fire? (avoiding circular
reasoning) Just how should fire be defined? And by whom?
And what is their expertise in the physics of fire?
Similarly, 'electricity itself is considered not fire'.
By whom? How is electricity defined? By whom? And what
is their expertise in the physics of electricity? Just
how much do these 'definers' know about physics? As
someone on the net brought out some time ago, metabolism
meets the criteria of fire and, by simple invocation of
the rules, is prohibited on Shabbat. Intent is not a
deciding factor. If, on Shabbat, you hold a magnifying
glass over paper to read better, and the sunlight kindles it,
you have kindled a fire and transgressed Torah. It is
a misstep rather than a deliberate transgression, but
a transgression nevertheless. 

It also seems to me that to declare that '"at once" 
is approximately 2 seconds...' is at best arbitrary 
without providing some basis. Even though Talmud may
well state or imply so (I haven't looked it up), 
'at once' today is different than it was then. Now 
if written Torah says that, then I will buy it anyway - 
but it does not.

My conclusion continues (for the present at least) to be
that there is no valid prohibition against the use of
electricity, per se, in Torah unless it results in
the kindling of a flame. Further, that an electrical
spark, such as in an electric motor or spark plug, is
also not encompassed in the Torah injunction, nor is
a resulting explosion. The KINDLING OF fire, as it 
was understood by Moshe, for instance, was synonymous 
with the effort and activity associated with generating
flames, and not the same as lightning nor an explosion.
Electricity was not at all intended. For this reason,
I also see no problem with driving on Shabbat. In
both cases, the primary injunction could well be
argued that the purpose was to curtail the 'work'
which was involved it such activities. There is no
evidence that modern interpretations of 'creative
acts' was known in those early times. The consequence
of such a conclusion would be that if it were the
work which was involved which was the reason for
forbidding kindling a fire and travel, then the
lack of work in turning on a range (with pilot light
already lit), an electric range, an electric light,
or operating an automobile removes the cause of the
prohibition. Since the prohibition of kindling a
flame is specifically forbidden however, it remains
just that. The intertwining of the two by those who
interpret Torah to us is, in my opinion, subject to
question and of doubtful validity.

Thanks to Robert Shnidman for his contribution. It
stimulated thought and, hopefully, will provoke
continued thought and examination in increasingly
greater depth.