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From: densinge@stolaf.UUCP (Charles W. Densinger)
Newsgroups: net.abortion
Subject: Re: Densinger -- still has it wrong
Message-ID: <2208@stolaf.UUCP>
Date: Mon, 26-Nov-84 13:16:22 EST
Article-I.D.: stolaf.2208
Posted: Mon Nov 26 13:16:22 1984
Date-Received: Tue, 27-Nov-84 04:18:44 EST
Organization: St. Olaf College, Northfield MN
Lines: 74

>Densinger's errors center on this assertion:
>>> We simply CANNOT ever know moral Truth.

>First of all, knock off that capital T.  Second, it ain't so.  We can so
>know moral truth, using plain old human reason and experience.  Note that
>small t.  Moral truth is human truth; if a norm is valid for humans then
>it has to be knowable for us.

Paul Torek and I are talking about two different things: subjectivity
and objectivity.  I do not believe that humans can know objective truth,
and I used the capital T above to indicate this.  Knowledge of eternal,
universal, objective truth can be had only by an eternal, omniscienct
being.  Paul misunderstands me if he thinks I am suggesting that there
are no human truths.  We have to have things we believe in in order to
get out of bed in the morning.  My campaign is against those who claim
to have access to eternal knowledge, to Right and Wrong, to Truth.
When we make claims of this nature, we are attempting to grab onto some
measure of objectivity.  We want something sure, tangible.  Why do we
need this?  Because we are terrified of our limitations, that we might
not really know.  We might not know, for instance, the solution to the
abortion question.

I am not a dreary skeptic.  In fact, I feel that the only way to avoid
cynicism and hopeless skepticism if to confront the realities of our
predicament as human beings.  If Paul knows what he is saying when he
says that "moral truth is human truth," fine.  Most people don't.  Human
truth is subjective and limited.  We can only really know our own
picture and what fits within it.  Too many people (all of us, at times,
including myself) mistake subjective certitudes for objectivity.  I KNOW
murder is morally, universally, eternally WRONG.  How?  We can't say
much more than "Because I just do."  What Paul is really talking about
is subjective truth, not objective truth, and what we must remember with
subjective truth is that every subject has a different truth.

>>> This is why making personal moral decisions is so difficult ...
>If Densinger were right it wouldn't be difficult, it would be IMPOSSIBLE.
>The very concept of human freedom depends on our ability to know what
>norms apply to us...
>Tense, painful moral decisions are disvaluable, not valuable.  It would be
>nice (though the possibility is purely hypothetical) if tough decisions were
>unnecessary.  Tense decisions are also no paradigm of freedom.  The less
>certain a decision is (if correct), the less free.  (The more certain the less
>free if the decision is incorrect.)

It seems clear to me that if making moral decisions were not difficult,
no one would be immoral.  I think Paul is deluding himself if he thinks
that it is easy to make decisions like whether to return the extra change
you got from the cashier or not or whether to report the crime you
witnessed or to stay uninvolved, much less a decision like whether or not
to have an abortion.  Difficulty in making a decision is often a sign of
the value that situation has for us; we do not agonize over things we
don't care about.

Other than this, I do not care to say much about Paul's comments.  He
uses the word "tense" where I used the word difficult.  These are not
the same and are not necessarily even related.  Many tasks are difficult
without making us tense.  I think he is making a mistake in aligning
freedom with easy decisions.  Life is not, nor ought it to be easy.  We
generally value those accomplishments we have made which have been
difficult or have demanded much of us.

>Densinger should reflect that the same Kant to whom he refers upheld the
>thesis that moral truths are humanly knowable and that universalizable
>principles can and must be used.  There are limits to the limits of human
>reason.

Kant fails, I think, in his attempt to re-establish morality after he
blasts pure reason.  He feels uncomfortable with his groundlessness.  It
is here that Kierkegaard offers the world a great insight.  Kierkegaard
it quite comfortable with the limits of reason which deny humans eternal
knowledge, and so am I.

         -Chuck Densinger
          {decvax|ihnp4}!stolaf!densinge