Relay-Version: version B 2.10 5/3/83; site utzoo.UUCP Posting-Version: version B 2.10.1 6/24/83; site fisher.UUCP Path: utzoo!watmath!clyde!burl!ulysses!allegra!princeton!astrovax!fisher!david From: david@fisher.UUCP (David Rubin) Newsgroups: net.politics Subject: Re: Re: US control of NATO Message-ID: <513@fisher.UUCP> Date: Thu, 31-Jan-85 09:25:56 EST Article-I.D.: fisher.513 Posted: Thu Jan 31 09:25:56 1985 Date-Received: Sat, 2-Feb-85 00:57:36 EST References: <718@utcsrgv.UUCP> Organization: Princeton Univ. Statistics Lines: 169 >> = David Rubin redux > = Vassos Hadzilacos redux = David Rubin redux redux >> Another interesting fact is that American military aid to Greece and >> Turkey is fixed in the ratio of 7:10. If the US were free in this >> regard, Turkey would be receiving far more aid than Greece [...] >> Am I to draw the conclusion that the Greek government exercises >> control over the US government because they have successfully >> pressured the US into following an alternate policy? [...] >> Apparently, people like you are willing to equate pressure >> with coercion [...] >When an elephant is "applying pressure" on an ant, yes I tend to view >that as coercion. I consider it evident that the relationship between the >US and Greece is not equitable. If you don't, I'll be happy to provide >evidence. It evidently isn't, since you regard pressure by Greece upon the US as fair play, but pressure by the US on Greece as out of bounds. However, Greece remains free to withdraw from NATO and end all military relations with the US (including, of course, aid). No plausible amount of US pressure would be sufficient to prevent this, unless either (1) The ending of that relationship is contrary to Greek interests, or (2) The reaction of the Common Market would be so unpleasant that #1 again applies. >> Your beef is with the politicians in Athens, not in Washington. >Well, for better or worse, no one tried to defend the decisions of >the politicians in Athens in this newsgroup. Someone tried to defend >the decisions of the politicians in Washington and that's what I was >responding to. Moreover, whatever my beef with Athenian politicians, >it was the "politicians in Washington" (some of them, anyhow) not those >in Athens who saddled my country with seven years of bloody, fascist rule. >This weighs on my mind too -- and I have no apologies for this "subjectivity". You are quite right about some politicians in Washington bearing some responsibility for the Greek military dictatorship, but to exempt all Greek politicians from similar blame is ingenuous. Don't misunderstand me; my country's actions regarding the coup in Greece were despicable. What I am arguing is that Greece's interests still bind it to the US; apparently the politicians in Athens agree. Moreover, this "subjectivity" of yours appears to be selective. Do you still bear resentment towards Germany and Italy for their direct and bloodier occupation during World War II? Do you bear resentment towards the Soviet Union and Bulgaria for their incitement of Greece's bloody civil war? If you do, you cannot advocate any reasonable policy. If you don't, then you must concede that your resentment towards the US will pass, too, and you ought not let that resentment interfere with your judgment of Greece's national interests, even in the present. >> The loss to American interests resulting from continued Turko-Greek >> hostility is far greater than any possible gain from the >> weakening of a minor non-aligned power [i.e. Cyprus]. [...] >I am afraid you missed the point, so let me repeat it. First, no >US "interest" was "lost" due to continued Turko-Greek hostility (yet). >Greece is still in NATO, the US and NATO bases there are alive and well. >(I must say, things aren't as good for the US gov't as they were during >the years of the junta, but hey -- can't have it all.) Weapon sales >(and I mean sales, not "aid") to both countries are soaring. >Second, the "gain" to US "interests" does not lie in the weakening >of a "minor non-aligned power", but in the passing of an extremely >strategic island to the US "sphere of influence". Hell, the US can't >have their bases in Cyprus today. If the island was partitioned between >Greece and Turkey they would. [A few minutes' flight from Lebanon. Not bad!] You apparently miss my point, too. American interests have already been severely damaged by the dispute, as both countries now deploy much of their forces (in the case of Greece, almost all) against one another, not against the Warsaw Pact. The poisoned relations between the two countries also makes the necessary cooperation between them in case of a general European war extremely problematic. Much of US aid (yes, the US sells some, but gives away more) to the two nations is wasted (from an American point of view) in deployment against the other. And even you will concede that the gain of a base in a permanently partitioned Cyprus while retaining valuable bases in Greece would be impossible. Further, the bases in Greece are more valuable, as they oversee routes the Soviet fleet would have to use to gain access to the Mediterranean, while a potential base in Cyprus would provide no new capability to US forces (it would be redundant). The Greek bases are now also far more expensive, in both political and monetary capital, to maintain. >> Your view of American priorities is quite self-serving >> (and contradictory); on the one hand you argue that NATO is a vehicle >> for the advancement of primarily American interests, yet on the other >> you claim that the US is supporting the division of Cyprus, which >> seriously weakens that vehicle. >I'll skip the "self-serving" business. Suffice it to say that what >I'm interested in discussing is the correctness of my view on >US priorities -- my psychological motivations for holding that view >isn't a subject I care to debate in net.politics. Yet you bring up your resentment of past US policy as rationalization for your "subjectivity". >Concerning the "contradiction". There is none: on the one hand NATO _is_ >a vehicle for the advancement of US interests; on the very same hand >the US is supporting the division of Cyprus while seeking the optimal >type of division -- one that will not just FORCE any Greek government >out of NATO. I don't see any contradiction here; apparently neither >does the US gov't. Again, you are being ingenuous. Any partition of Cyprus which allowed the US to build a Cypriot base would result in Greece's withdrawal from NATO. US policy tends to be extremely conservative and risk-averse, not the daring, gambling policy which you presume. >> Finally, if Cyprus were reconstituted and a general settlement of >> outstanding Greco-Turkish disputes were reached, the political >> position of the Greek government would be weakened, as they would no >> longer be able to blame their shortcomings on the US and would not be >> able to reap the benefit of nationalist feeling directed against >> Turkey. >This is something that only someone totally oblivious to the realities >of Greek politics could concoct. Any Greek government that succeeded >in bringing about a stable and just solution to the Cyprus situation, >would have guaranteed its election and re-election until, at least, >the millenium. The one thing the present Greek government is guilty of, >is recanting on its pre-election promises to rid the country of the >US domination that has caused much blood and tears since 1947. Gratitude is good for one election, tops. To the end of the millenium? Surely an exaggeration. Moreover, your previous rationalization of your "subjectivity" lend credence to my claim that resentment is a powerful political force. Far more so, I submit, than gratitude. Your last comment, regarding what the present Greek government is "guilty" of (I believe it is guilty of acting in the national interest), is precisely what I meant when I suggested you blame Athenian politicians for your dissatisfaction. There is where the decisions are made regarding Greece's continued NATO membership, not in Washington. >Vassos Hadzilacos. >PS: An incident that recently arose sheds intriguing light >to the question of what sort of interests Greece's participation >in NATO serves. In the NATO War College, in Rome, and in the presence >of Greek officers, a seminar was held developing a scenario whereby >a leftist gov't is elected in Greece, resulting in a coup d' etat by >the Greek army... >[Oh, I can't stand all those radical pinkos who, through naivete or >malice, just can't bring themselves to accept the simple fact: >NATO was set up to defend Freedom and Democracy.] At NATO installations they constantly game (simulate) different military situations, including tactical nuclear warfare in West Germany, civil war in Poland, and sabotage of industry by the French and Italian Communist Parties. Does this mean that they foresee (or act to bring about) such events? Conspiracies everywhere... The fundamental problem is that the Greek political body is highly polarized with very few basic policies reached by national consensus. It is this which makes Greek democracy more fragile than most other Western ones, not some simulation by Americans, Italians, Germans, and Belgians whose plausibility is derived from recent Greek history. David Rubin {allegra|astrovax|princeton}!fisher!david