Relay-Version: version B 2.10 5/3/83; site utzoo.UUCP Posting-Version: version B 2.10.2 9/18/84; site gatech.UUCP Path: utzoo!watmath!clyde!burl!ulysses!gatech!spaf From: spaf@gatech.UUCP (Gene Spafford) Newsgroups: net.news.stargate Subject: Re: how to verify an article's submitter Message-ID: <12022@gatech.UUCP> Date: Thu, 14-Feb-85 10:58:19 EST Article-I.D.: gatech.12022 Posted: Thu Feb 14 10:58:19 1985 Date-Received: Fri, 15-Feb-85 06:04:07 EST References: <462@aquila.noao.UUCP> Reply-To: spaf@gatech.UUCP (Gene Spafford) Organization: The Clouds Project, School of ICS, Georgia Tech Lines: 37 Keywords: public keys, cryptographic protocols Summary: Jay presents a very nice solution to the verfication problem except for a few problems -- one of which makes it unworkable. Let's suppose for a moment that we do have a large enough, unique enough key space. Let us further suppose we have the appropriate software to encrypt and decrypt mail, and a mail transport mechanism which will pass encrypted mail and still adhere to the appropriate Internet standards. We'll also assume a reasonable encryption function. I write up an article which looks reasonable but which actually is libelous in some form or another. I encrypt it and send it to the moderator. It gets published. As soon as I see it appear, I send frantic sounding messages to the moderator, the keeper of the keys, and my system administrator claiming that someone must have broken into my account and found my key sitting in a file. Better yet, I can claim that I accidentally had the permissions on the file with my key set to public-read. Prove I didn't. In fact, to cover myself, I don't have to even send out those frantic-sounding messages. I just have to wait until someone complains. The I can claim something like: "I posted WHAT? The entire Unix kernel? Never! I didn't do that! Wait...now I understand why my news-key file was set to 644 (or why the holder of "root" at my site was chuckling about how he 'was going to get even with me.'") Don't put the key in a file, you say? Make me. Sorry. Digital signature protocols generally assume that (at least) the identity og the sender or the privacy of the key are a given. We have a situation where both are not secure. That turns the situation into one that is much more difficult to deal with. -- Gene "6 months and counting" Spafford The Clouds Project, School of ICS, Georgia Tech, Atlanta GA 30332 CSNet: Spaf @ GATech ARPA: Spaf%GATech.CSNet @ CSNet-Relay.ARPA uucp: ...!{akgua,allegra,hplabs,ihnp4,linus,seismo,ulysses}!gatech!spaf